23 N.Y.3d 112 (2014)
A trial court is not required to submit a charge of reckless manslaughter (second-degree) as a lesser included offense of intentional homicide (e.g., second-degree murder) unless there is a reasonable view of the evidence to support a finding that the defendant acted recklessly, meaning the record doesn’t automatically require a reckless manslaughter charge even if it doesn’t completely exclude the possibility of recklessness.
Summary
Enrique Rivera was convicted of first-degree manslaughter for the stabbing death of Edgar Ojeda in a bar. Rivera argued the trial court erred by not submitting second-degree manslaughter (reckless manslaughter) to the jury. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that there was no reasonable view of the evidence to support a finding that Rivera acted recklessly. The court emphasized that the nature of the victim’s wounds and the defendant’s own statements indicated an intent to cause serious physical injury, precluding a finding of mere recklessness. The court reiterated that a lesser included offense instruction is only required when there is a rational basis for the jury to reject evidence establishing the greater crime while accepting evidence of the lesser crime.
Facts
Rivera and Ojeda were both at a Brooklyn bar. Rivera approached Ojeda, and after a brief verbal exchange, Rivera stabbed Ojeda multiple times. Eyewitnesses saw Rivera strike or push Ojeda in the chest. Ojeda died from a stab wound to the chest that pierced his lung and a rib. Rivera initially told police he swung a knife at the crowd in self-defense but didn’t know if he had hurt anyone. At trial, Rivera testified that he did not bring the knife and did not stab Ojeda.
Procedural History
Rivera was charged with second-degree murder and criminal possession of a weapon. At trial, he requested that the court also submit charges of second-degree manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide. The trial court refused to submit second-degree manslaughter to the jury. The jury acquitted Rivera of murder but convicted him of first-degree manslaughter. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.
Issue(s)
Whether the trial court erred in refusing to submit a charge of second-degree manslaughter to the jury as a lesser included offense of second-degree murder.
Holding
No, because there was no reasonable view of the evidence that would support a finding that Rivera acted recklessly rather than intentionally causing serious physical injury, as required for first-degree manslaughter.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals applied the two-pronged test for determining whether a lesser included offense should be charged: (1) the crime must be a lesser included offense, and (2) there must be a reasonable view of the evidence to support a finding that the defendant committed the lesser offense but not the greater. The Court acknowledged that second-degree manslaughter is a lesser included offense of second-degree murder. However, the Court found that Rivera failed to satisfy the second prong because there was no reasonable view of the evidence to suggest recklessness. The court considered the forensic pathologist’s testimony that the wounds were stab wounds, not the result of merely “waving” a knife. Further, the court noted the depth and location of the wounds, which indicated an intent to cause at least serious physical injury. The Court rejected Rivera’s argument that his initial statement suggested recklessness, finding it inconsistent with the nature of the wounds and the circumstances of the stabbing. The Court emphasized that jury instructions should not invite the jury to compromise or return an unwarranted verdict. Quoting People v. Scarborough, 49 NY2d 364, 369-370 (1980), the court stated that “if, on the whole record, there is not some identifiable, rational basis on which the jury could reject a portion of the prosecution’s case which is indispensable to establishment of the higher crime and yet accept so much of the proof as would establish the lesser crime, then the lesser included offense may not be submitted”. The court found no such rational basis here.