21 N.Y.3d 183 (2013)
A party has standing to challenge agency regulations based on procedural violations if they have a concrete interest affected by the agency’s failure to follow procedure and the asserted statutory provisions are designed to protect that interest.
Summary
The Town of Riverhead and its Community Development Agency challenged amendments to the New York Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) regulations regarding endangered and threatened species, alleging both procedural flaws and substantive defects. The New York Court of Appeals held that Riverhead had standing to pursue claims based on procedural violations concerning the failure to consult with the State Environmental Board, conduct public hearings, and properly analyze regulatory impacts. However, the Court found that Riverhead lacked standing to pursue substantive claims because they had not yet suffered concrete harm from the regulations’ application.
Facts
The Town of Riverhead owned approximately 3,000 acres of land, formerly a Grumman facility, conveyed by the U.S. Navy for economic redevelopment. This land, known as Enterprise Park at Calverton (EPCAL), was habitat for endangered or threatened species. The DEC amended its regulations regarding incidental taking permits for such species, requiring mitigation plans with a net conservation benefit. Riverhead challenged these amendments, claiming both procedural and substantive violations.
Procedural History
Riverhead commenced a hybrid CPLR article 78 proceeding/declaratory judgment action. The Supreme Court dismissed the proceeding, finding a lack of ripeness and standing. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding the procedural claims were ripe but that Riverhead lacked standing due to failure to allege injury-in-fact. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
1. Whether Riverhead has standing to challenge the DEC regulations based on procedural violations, specifically the failure to refer the proposed amendments to the State Environmental Board, hold public hearings, and properly evaluate and analyze the potential regulatory impacts.
2. Whether Riverhead has standing to challenge the DEC regulations based on substantive claims, such as ultra vires, impermissible regulatory taking, and arbitrary and capricious action.
Holding
1. Yes, because Riverhead, as a governmental entity owning land subject to the amended regulations, alleged a sufficient injury-in-fact by asserting a concrete interest in the matter regulated and a concrete injury from the agency’s failure to follow procedure. The asserted statutory provisions also set forth certain procedural steps to be followed when promulgating rules or regulations and the alleged violations, including the deprivation of an opportunity to be heard, constitute injuries to petitioners within the zone of interests sought to be protected by the statutes.
2. No, because Riverhead had not yet suffered a concrete injury from the application of the substantive provisions of the regulations. Until Riverhead submits a permit application and DEC imposes the requirements of the amended regulations to their detriment, allegations that they are affected by those requirements through an encumbrance on their property or the imposition of costs are too speculative.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court reasoned that standing requires both an injury-in-fact and that the asserted injury falls within the zone of interests protected by the relevant statute. In land use matters, the injury must be different from that of the public at large. The Court acknowledged that standing rules should not be overly restrictive, particularly when shielding actions from judicial review.
Regarding the procedural claims, the Court found that Riverhead had demonstrated a concrete interest and injury. The procedural violations deprived Riverhead of an adequate airing of the issues and impacts, as well as an accurate assessment of costs. The Court emphasized that denying standing would insulate the amendments from timely procedural challenge, which is against public interest. The Court cited Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, noting that a litigant can enforce procedural rights if the procedures are designed to protect a threatened concrete interest.
The Court further reasoned that economic injury alone does not confer standing under SEQRA. Regarding the substantive claims, the Court found they were not ripe because there had been no final agency action inflicting concrete harm. “Until petitioners submit a permit application and DEC imposes the requirements of the amended regulations to their detriment, allegations that they are affected by those requirements through an encumbrance on their property or the imposition of costs are too speculative.”
The court distinguished the case from situations where parties are merely alleging a failure to follow SAPA requirements, clarifying that the universe of potential plaintiffs is suitably delimited to those with a direct and concrete interest.