22 N.Y.3d 762 (2014)

In toxic tort cases involving alleged injuries from mold exposure, plaintiffs must establish both general causation (that mold can cause the alleged injuries) and specific causation (that the plaintiff was exposed to sufficient levels of mold to cause the injuries) through scientifically reliable evidence.

Summary

Brenda Cornell sued 360 West 51st Street Corp., alleging that mold exposure in her apartment caused various health problems. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, finding that Cornell failed to present sufficient evidence to establish either general or specific causation. The court emphasized that expert testimony must be based on generally accepted scientific principles and methodologies, and that a mere association between mold exposure and health issues is insufficient to prove causation. The court highlighted the importance of quantifying exposure levels and ruling out other potential causes of the plaintiff’s symptoms.

Facts

Brenda Cornell resided in a first-floor apartment owned by 360 West 51st Street Corp. from 1997 to 2003. She alleged that the building’s basement was damp and musty, her radiator leaked, and mold grew in her bathroom. After demolition work in the basement in October 2003, Cornell claimed she experienced dizziness, rashes, and breathing difficulties. She asserted these conditions forced her to vacate the apartment and discard her belongings due to mold contamination.

Procedural History

Cornell sued 360 West 51st Street Corp. for personal injuries and property damage. The landlord moved for summary judgment, arguing Cornell could not prove mold caused her injuries. 360 West 51st Street Corp. cross-moved for summary judgment, adopting the landlord’s arguments. Supreme Court granted the landlord’s motion, dismissing the claims, and denied Cornell’s motion. The Appellate Division reversed, reinstating the complaint against 360 West 51st Street Corp. The Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division’s decision.

Issue(s)

1. Whether Cornell presented sufficient evidence to establish general causation, i.e., that mold exposure can cause the types of injuries she alleged.

2. Whether Cornell presented sufficient evidence to establish specific causation, i.e., that she was exposed to sufficient levels of mold to cause her alleged injuries.

Holding

1. No, because Cornell failed to demonstrate that the relevant scientific community generally accepts that mold causes the specific adverse health effects she claimed to have suffered. Her expert’s reliance on studies showing an association between mold and health issues was insufficient to prove causation.

2. No, because Cornell failed to quantify her exposure to mold or identify the specific disease-causing agent. Her expert’s differential diagnosis lacked a proper foundation, as it did not adequately rule out other potential causes of her symptoms or demonstrate that she was exposed to sufficient levels of mold to cause her illness.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals determined that the Appellate Division improperly applied the Frye test, which requires that scientific evidence be generally accepted within the relevant scientific community. The court found that Cornell’s expert, Dr. Johanning, failed to demonstrate general acceptance of his theory that mold caused her specific injuries. The court emphasized that studies showing an association between mold and health problems are insufficient to prove causation. The court also found that Cornell failed to establish specific causation. While Parker v. Mobil Oil Corp. (7 NY3d 434 [2006]) does not require