People v. Flinn, 22 N.Y.3d 600 (2014)
A defendant’s right to be present during bench conferences with prospective jurors (Antommarchi right) can be waived both implicitly by the defendant’s conduct and explicitly by defense counsel, even when the waiver is stated outside the defendant’s immediate hearing.
Summary
Flinn was convicted of attempted murder. Prior to jury selection, the trial judge informed the defendant that he was welcome to attend bench conferences. Defense counsel later stated, outside of the defendant’s hearing, that Flinn had waived his right to be present at these conferences. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that Flinn implicitly waived his Antommarchi right by not attending the conferences after being informed he was welcome, and explicitly waived it through his counsel’s statement. The Court reasoned that attorneys can waive this right on behalf of their clients.
Facts
The trial judge informed Flinn that he was welcome to attend bench conferences during jury selection.
During a bench conference, defense counsel stated that Flinn had waived his right to attend these conferences.
Flinn did not attend any of the bench conferences during voir dire.
Procedural History
Flinn was convicted of attempted murder in the trial court.
The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.
The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether the defendant validly waived his right under People v. Antommarchi to be present during bench conferences at which prospective jurors were questioned on voir dire, both implicitly through his actions and explicitly through his counsel’s statement made outside his hearing.
Holding
Yes, because the defendant implicitly waived his right by choosing not to attend the bench conferences after being informed he was welcome, and explicitly waived it through his counsel’s statement to the court. The Court has repeatedly held that counsel can waive a client’s Antommarchi right.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court found that Flinn implicitly waived his right, similar to the situation in People v. Williams, because he was informed he was “welcome to attend” the bench conferences and chose not to. The Court reasoned that the critical point was that Flinn understood he was free to attend if he wanted to.
Regarding the explicit waiver, the Court relied on prior holdings in cases like People v. Velasquez and People v. Keen, stating that a lawyer may waive the Antommarchi right of their client. The Court dismissed the argument that the waiver was invalid because the lawyer’s statement was made outside Flinn’s hearing, emphasizing that lawyers are trusted to explain rights to their clients and accurately report the outcome of those discussions to the court. The Court stated, “[T]he premise of Velasquez and Keen is that a lawyer may be trusted to explain rights to his or her client, and to report to the court the result of that discussion.”