People v. Mateo, 24 N.Y.3d 491 (2014)
Appellate counsel may not withdraw from representing a defendant if the appeal is not wholly frivolous, meaning there are non-frivolous arguments that could be raised on appeal.
Summary
Mateo pleaded guilty to first-degree manslaughter and was sentenced to 23 years’ incarceration, with no mention of post-release supervision (PRS). The Department of Correctional Services later added a five-year PRS term. Mateo, after learning of the PRS, filed a motion claiming her plea was defective because she was never informed about the PRS. The People consented to resentencing without PRS under Penal Law § 70.85. On appeal of the resentence, assigned counsel filed a Crawford motion to withdraw, arguing no non-frivolous issues existed. Mateo argued pro se that her sentence was illegal and that she received ineffective assistance. The Appellate Division granted counsel’s motion and affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because Mateo’s claims were not wholly frivolous, counsel should not have been allowed to withdraw, and a de novo appeal was warranted.
Facts
Mateo pleaded guilty to first-degree manslaughter for a shooting. She received a determinate sentence of 23 years. Neither during the plea proceedings nor at sentencing was there any mention of post-release supervision (PRS). After incarceration, the Department of Correctional Services added a five-year PRS term to her certificate of commitment. Mateo learned of the PRS period from her attorney, who did not advise her whether she could challenge the PRS term on appeal. Her conviction was initially affirmed.
Procedural History
Following People v. Catu, Mateo filed a pro se motion pursuant to CPL 440.10, claiming her plea was defective due to the lack of information regarding PRS. The People consented to resentencing under Penal Law § 70.85 to remove the PRS term. Mateo appealed the resentence. Assigned counsel, after reviewing the file and citing People v. Boyd, filed a Crawford motion to withdraw, arguing there were no non-frivolous issues. Mateo filed a pro se supplemental brief arguing her sentence was illegal and that she was denied effective assistance of counsel. The Appellate Division granted counsel’s motion and affirmed the resentence. This appeal to the New York Court of Appeals followed.
Issue(s)
Whether the Appellate Division erred in granting appellate counsel’s Crawford motion to withdraw, where the defendant’s claims on appeal (the constitutionality of Penal Law § 70.85 as applied to her case and ineffective assistance of counsel) were not wholly frivolous.
Holding
Yes, because the defendant’s claims were not wholly frivolous at the time appellate counsel filed his Crawford motion, the Appellate Division should have denied appellate counsel’s motion.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reasoned that under Crawford, appellate counsel may withdraw only if the appeal is “wholly frivolous,” as a defendant with a frivolous appeal has no right to have an advocate argue their case. The Court found that Mateo’s claims—the unconstitutionality of Penal Law § 70.85 as applied to her, and ineffective assistance of counsel—were not wholly frivolous. The Court emphasized that it was expressing no opinion on the ultimate merits of those claims, but that the claims warranted further review. Because counsel should not have been permitted to withdraw, the Court reversed and remitted the case to the Appellate Division for a de novo appeal. The Court cited People v. Stokes, People v. Pignataro, and People v. Catu in support of this remedy. The Court’s decision underscores the importance of ensuring that defendants receive adequate representation on appeal, particularly when there are potentially meritorious issues to be raised, such as the constitutionality of a statute or ineffective assistance of counsel.