People v. Dalton, 22 N.Y.3d 983 (2013)
When a defendant’s factual recitation during a plea allocution negates an essential element of the crime, the trial court must inquire further to ensure the defendant understands the nature of the charge and that the plea is intelligently entered; failure to do so allows the defendant to challenge the sufficiency of the allocution on direct appeal, even if unpreserved.
Summary
Defendant Dalton pleaded guilty to third-degree rape. During the plea allocution, the court and attorneys misunderstood the definition of “lack of consent” under Penal Law § 130.25(3). Dalton stated the complainant didn’t consent because she took too much medication and had a mental illness, thus negating an element of the crime. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the plea allocution was insufficient because Dalton’s statements negated an essential element of the crime, and the trial court failed to adequately inquire further, falling within the exception to the preservation rule articulated in People v. Lopez.
Facts
Dalton was charged with two counts of third-degree rape for having sexual intercourse with his former girlfriend while she was under the influence of psychotropic medication. The complainant testified she awoke during each incident and demanded the intercourse cease. Dalton claimed the complainant was awake during the intercourse and gave no indication it was non-consensual. He later pleaded guilty to one count of third-degree rape.
Procedural History
The Monroe County Court accepted Dalton’s guilty plea. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding that Dalton’s challenge to the plea’s sufficiency was unpreserved and that the People v. Lopez exception did not apply. Dalton appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether the plea’s factual allocution was sufficient to support the conviction for third-degree rape when the defendant’s statements negated an essential element of the crime.
Holding
No, because the defendant’s factual recitation during the plea allocution negated an essential element of the crime, and the trial court failed to inquire further to ensure the defendant understood the nature of the charge. This falls within the narrow exception to the preservation rule recognized in People v. Lopez.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals focused on the statutory definition of “lack of consent” in Penal Law § 130.25(3), which requires that the lack of consent be “by reason of some factor other than incapacity to consent.” It emphasized that the victim must have “clearly expressed an unwillingness to engage in the sexual act in such a way that a neutral observer would have understood that the victim was not consenting” (citing People v. Newton, 8 N.Y.3d 460, 464 (2007)). The Court found that the prosecutor, defense counsel, and the trial court misunderstood this definition. The court highlighted that when the trial court asked Dalton if the complainant didn’t consent because she took too much medication and had a mental illness, and Dalton answered affirmatively, he negated an element of the crime. The Court stated, “Where the court fails in this duty and accepts the plea without further inquiry, the defendant may challenge the sufficiency of the allocution on direct appeal, notwithstanding his or her failure to raise it before the trial court” (citing People v. Lopez, 71 N.Y.2d 662, 666 (1988)). Because the factual recitation negated an element of third-degree rape and the court’s inquiry exacerbated the defect, the Lopez exception applied. The court emphasized that