20 N.Y.3d 972 (2012)
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Padilla v. Kentucky did not create a new “rationality” test for prejudice in ineffective assistance of counsel claims related to deportation advice; the existing “reasonable probability” standard from Strickland v. Washington and Hill v. Lockhart still applies.
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Summary
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Diaz, a lawful permanent resident, pleaded guilty to sexual abuse. After sentencing, he faced deportation. He then sought to vacate his conviction, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney didn’t advise him about the deportation consequences of his plea. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s denial of his motion, holding that Diaz failed to demonstrate a “reasonable probability” that he would have gone to trial had he known about the deportation consequences. The court clarified that Padilla v. Kentucky did not alter the existing standard for prejudice in such cases.
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Facts
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Diaz, a lawful permanent resident from the Dominican Republic, was charged with attempted rape and sexual abuse. He pleaded guilty to sexual abuse in the first degree. His attorney did not advise him that deportation was a mandatory consequence of his plea. After sentencing, federal immigration authorities initiated deportation proceedings. Diaz argued he would not have pleaded guilty had he known about the deportation consequences, as he wished to remain with his family.
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Procedural History
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After a federal immigration judge ordered Diaz’s removal, Diaz moved to vacate his conviction under CPL 440.10, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court held a hearing and denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed, with a divided panel. A dissenting Justice granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.
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Issue(s)
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Whether Padilla v. Kentucky established a new “rationality” test for prejudice in ineffective assistance of counsel claims related to deportation advice, or whether the traditional “reasonable probability” test from Strickland v. Washington and Hill v. Lockhart still applies.
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Holding
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No, because Padilla did not create a new standard for prejudice. The Court in Padilla repeatedly cited cases setting forth the traditional “reasonable probability” test, and the language regarding “rationality” was simply a rephrasing of the existing rule.
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Court’s Reasoning
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The Court of Appeals rejected Diaz’s argument that Padilla created a new