People v. Brinson, 20 NY3d 492 (2013): Double Jeopardy and Resentencing for Postrelease Supervision

People v. Brinson, 20 N.Y.3d 492 (2013)

Resentencing a defendant to include mandatory postrelease supervision (PRS) after the original determinate sentence was served, but while the defendant is still incarcerated serving an aggregated sentence, does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because the defendant lacks a legitimate expectation of finality until the entire aggregated sentence is completed.

Summary

Defendants Brinson and Blankymsee were resentenced to include mandatory postrelease supervision (PRS) after their original sentences omitted it. They argued this violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, as they had already served their determinate sentences. The New York Court of Appeals held that the resentencing did not violate double jeopardy because the defendants were still serving their aggregated sentences under Penal Law § 70.30. The Court reasoned that defendants do not have a legitimate expectation of finality in their sentences until their entire aggregated sentence is completed. This decision clarifies when resentencing for PRS is permissible without violating double jeopardy protections.

Facts

Christopher Brinson was arrested on December 8, 1998, and sentenced on July 14, 2000, to a determinate term of 10 years for second-degree robbery, an indeterminate term of 3 to 6 years for third-degree robbery, and an indeterminate term of 2 to 4 years for fourth-degree grand larceny. The indeterminate terms ran concurrently but consecutively to the determinate term. On April 28, 2010, he was resentenced to include five years of PRS on the determinate count.

Lawrence Blankymsee was sentenced on May 20, 2004, as a second felony offender, to seven concurrent prison terms, including determinate sentences of five years for two counts of loaded firearm possession and indeterminate sentences for other crimes. On October 20, 2010, he was resentenced to include five years of PRS on the determinate sentences for firearm possession.

Procedural History

In separate appeals, the Appellate Division affirmed the resentences, holding that the defendants did not have a legitimate expectation of finality in their determinate sentences because they had not completed their properly aggregated sentences before resentencing. A Judge of the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

Issue(s)

Whether the imposition of mandatory postrelease supervision (PRS) at resentencing violates the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause when the defendant has completed the determinate sentence for the count subject to PRS, but is still incarcerated serving an aggregate sentence calculated under Penal Law § 70.30.

Holding

No, because the defendants do not have a legitimate expectation of finality in their sentences until they have completed their aggregated sentences under Penal Law § 70.30.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals held that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits multiple punishments for the same crime, preventing a sentence from being increased once the defendant has a legitimate expectation in the finality of the sentence. However, defendants are presumed to know that a determinate sentence without PRS is illegal, and courts have the authority to correct illegal sentences. The Court emphasized that this opportunity to correct illegality is not without end, stating, “there must be a temporal limitation on a court’s ability to resentence a defendant since criminal courts do not have perpetual jurisdiction over all persons who were once sentenced for criminal acts.” That temporal limitation occurs once the sentence is served and the appeal is completed, or the time for such appeal has expired.

The Court relied on Penal Law § 70.30, which establishes the methodology for calculating a defendant’s multiple terms of imprisonment. In People v. Buss, 11 NY3d 553 (2008), the Court held that under Penal Law § 70.30, consecutive and concurrent sentences are merged or aggregated and thus “made into one.” Therefore, the Court concluded that defendants Brinson and Blankymsee would only have a legitimate expectation of finality upon completion of their respective aggregated sentences. Until that time, resentencing for the purpose of correcting their illegal determinate sentences does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.