People v. Dunbar, 24 N.Y.3d 207 (2014)
When a confession follows an extremely lengthy and coercive interrogation, a subsequent break in questioning and the presence of counsel do not automatically attenuate the taint of the initial coercion; the prosecution must demonstrate that the defendant’s will was not overborne by the prior illegality.
Summary
Dunbar was convicted of second-degree murder after confessing to the crime following a 49.5-hour custodial interrogation. The initial interrogation was deemed involuntary by the trial court. The key issue on appeal was whether Dunbar’s subsequent confession, made approximately 10 hours after the initial interrogation and in the presence of counsel, was sufficiently attenuated from the prior coercion to be admissible. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the prosecution failed to demonstrate that the coercive effects of the initial interrogation had been neutralized. The Court emphasized the extraordinary length and nature of the interrogation, coupled with the lack of evidence showing Dunbar’s recovery, made it impossible to conclude his subsequent confession was voluntary.
Facts
Dunbar was escorted by police to the Criminal Investigations Division (CID) and placed in a windowless room. He underwent a 49.5-hour interrogation with minimal breaks. Detectives worked in rotating pairs. Dunbar was read his Miranda rights only at the outset of the interrogation. By the second day, detectives noted Dunbar was “defeated” and often wept. Dunbar eventually offered to disclose the location of the victim’s body if he could confer with an attorney. An attorney was appointed. After a brief meeting with the attorney and an Assistant District Attorney, Dunbar stated, “I killed her.” He then provided details regarding the location of the body, which proved to be false. At no time was counsel informed of the length of the preceding interrogation.
Procedural History
The trial court suppressed statements made during the initial 49.5-hour interrogation. However, the court admitted Dunbar’s subsequent confession. Dunbar was convicted of second-degree murder. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that Dunbar’s later statements were sufficiently attenuated. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and ordered a new trial after granting Dunbar’s motion to suppress his statements from March 23rd.
Issue(s)
1. Whether a confession made after a 49.5-hour custodial interrogation, followed by a break and the presence of counsel, is admissible when the initial interrogation was deemed involuntary.
Holding
1. No, because the prosecution failed to demonstrate that the coercive effects of the prior illegal interrogation were sufficiently attenuated to render the subsequent confession voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court emphasized that the prosecution bears the burden of proving voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt, especially when official illegality has potentially impaired the voluntariness of a subsequent admission. The Court distinguished this case from those involving late Miranda warnings, where a “pronounced break” might suffice. Here, the predicate for involuntariness was actual coercion. The Court stated that “the inquiry as to whether there has been one interrogatory sequence or several does not address the very stubborn problem posed by actual coercion, which involves the physical, cognitive and emotional depletion of the interrogation subject.”
The Court found the length and nature of the interrogation extraordinary, citing Ashcraft v. Tennessee and People v. Anderson, which condemned prolonged interrogations designed to break a suspect’s will. Given the extreme privation (sleeplessness for over 50 hours and going without food for 30 hours), the Court could not accept that Dunbar’s capacity for independent judgment was quickly restored.
The Court also rejected the argument that the eight-hour break or the presence of counsel guaranteed voluntariness. It held that the “seamlessly linked” nature of Dunbar’s pre- and post-arraignment statements suggested continued coercion. Dunbar had already promised to “give everybody what they want” at the end of the initial interrogation. The Court emphasized that the attorney’s arrival did not neutralize the prior coercion, especially since counsel was unaware of the interrogation’s length and Dunbar distrusted him. The Court stated that “By the time assigned counsel arrived at the Blue Room, the die was largely cast. His client had, in exchange for his presence, already promised to “give everybody what they want” and had been so depleted by over two days of constant tag-team interrogation as to raise the most serious doubt, unresolved by the hearing evidence, as to his ability usefully to confer with counsel.”
The Court concluded that allowing a conviction based on statements obtained after such coercion would be “demonstrably hazardous to the truth.”