Galetta v. Galetta, 21 N.Y.3d 186 (2013)
A prenuptial agreement must be acknowledged in the manner required to entitle a deed to be recorded, and a defective acknowledgment, where a core component is missing, cannot be cured by a later affidavit if the affidavit does not provide sufficient detail of the notary’s customary practices.
Summary
In a divorce action, Michelle Galetta sought to invalidate a prenuptial agreement due to a defective acknowledgment of Gary Galetta’s signature. The New York Court of Appeals held that the acknowledgment was indeed defective because it omitted language confirming the notary’s verification of the signer’s identity. Furthermore, the court found that the notary’s affidavit, submitted later, was insufficient to cure the defect as it lacked specific details about the notary’s customary practices. The Court emphasized that prenuptial agreements must adhere strictly to the formality required for recorded deeds, ensuring deliberation and authentication of the signatures. As a result, the prenuptial agreement was deemed unenforceable.
Facts
Michelle and Gary Galetta signed a prenuptial agreement a week before their wedding in 1997. Each party signed separately, with different notaries public witnessing their signatures. The agreement stipulated that their separate properties would remain separate and neither would seek maintenance from the other. Gary’s certificate of acknowledgment omitted a crucial phrase indicating the notary confirmed Gary’s identity. In 2010, Gary filed for divorce, and Michelle sought to invalidate the prenuptial agreement based on the defective acknowledgment.
Procedural History
The Supreme Court denied Michelle’s motion for summary judgment, finding substantial compliance with the Real Property Law. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding the acknowledgment was defective but could be cured, finding the notary’s affidavit raised a triable issue of fact. A dissenting opinion argued the defect could not be cured. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
1. Whether the certificate of acknowledgment accompanying the husband’s signature was defective.
2. Whether a defective certificate of acknowledgment can be cured after the fact, and if so, whether the notary public’s affidavit was sufficient to raise a question of fact precluding summary judgment.
Holding
1. Yes, because the certificate of acknowledgment omitted language indicating the notary public knew or had ascertained the signer was the person described in the prenuptial agreement.
2. No, the affidavit was insufficient because it lacked specific details about the notary’s customary practices for verifying identity, even assuming a defect can be cured, therefore it did not raise a triable question of fact.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court reasoned that Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (3) requires prenuptial agreements to be executed with the same formality as recorded deeds, as per Real Property Law § 291. This formality serves to authenticate the signer’s identity and impose deliberation in signing, as established in Matisoff v. Dobi, 90 N.Y.2d 127 (1997). Real Property Law §§ 292, 303, and 306, read together, mandate that the notary confirm the signer’s identity and certify that confirmation. The court emphasized that “acknowledgment serves to prove the identity of the person whose name appears on an instrument and to authenticate the signature of such person.”
The Court distinguished Weinstein v. Weinstein, 36 A.D.3d 797 (2d Dept 2007), noting that the case involved a deviation in form, not substance, unlike the present case where a core component of a valid acknowledgment was missing. While the Court acknowledged the possibility of curing a defective acknowledgment under certain circumstances, it found the notary’s affidavit insufficient. The affidavit lacked specific details about the notary’s routine procedure for verifying identity. “Custom and practice evidence draws its probative value from the repetition and unvarying uniformity of the procedure…”. Because the notary only generally stated that it was his practice to “ask and confirm” the identity of the signer, it was too conclusory to establish a triable issue of fact.