People v. Hudy, 19 N.Y.3d 1042 (2012)
A trial court has discretion to limit cross-examination of a witness regarding evidence of sexual conduct or other matters where the probative value is outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice or confusion, and the Rape Shield Law generally prohibits evidence of a victim’s sexual conduct in sex offense prosecutions.
Summary
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction for sex offenses, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by limiting the cross-examination of the defendant’s daughter regarding her relationship with a teenage boy and her MySpace account content. The Court found the excluded evidence either fell under the Rape Shield Law or was of limited probative value compared to the risk of prejudice. The Court emphasized the defendant was given sufficient latitude to establish his defense that his daughter fabricated the charges.
Facts
The defendant was accused of sexually abusing his two daughters after his divorce. The older daughter disclosed the abuse following a heated phone conversation with the defendant after she was found at a 16-year-old boy’s house. The younger daughter later made similar allegations. The defendant and his older daughter had a strained relationship marked by disagreements about her behavior, attire, and relationships with boys. He threatened to send her to a “brat camp.”
Procedural History
The defendant was convicted of sexual abuse, rape, criminal sexual act, and endangering the welfare of a child. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether the trial court deprived the defendant of a fair trial by precluding: (1) cross-examination of the older daughter regarding the nature of her relationship with a 16-year-old boy; (2) cross-examination about her MySpace account postings and photos; and (3) evidence of her clothing choices?
Holding
No, because (1) the evidence regarding the daughter’s relationship with the boy fell within the Rape Shield Law; (2) the trial court has discretion to limit cross-examination where the probative value is outweighed by the risk of prejudice or confusion; and (3) the defendant was given sufficient latitude to develop his defense that his daughter had reasons to fabricate the charges.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court acted within its discretion. First, the Court stated that the evidence regarding the daughter’s relationship with the 16-year-old boy fell squarely within the ambit of the Rape Shield Law, which generally prohibits “[e]vidence of a victim’s sexual conduct” (CPL 60.42). The purpose of the Rape Shield Law is that such evidence “rarely elicits testimony relevant to the issues of the victim’s consent on credibility, but serves only to harass the alleged victim and confuse the jurors” (quoting People v. Scott, 16 NY3d 589, 594 [2011]). The Court noted that the defendant focused solely on alleged sexual behavior and did not attempt to elicit the general nature of the relationship. However, the trial court did permit evidence that the daughter failed to return home, was found at the boy’s house, and was angry at the defendant for involving the police.
Second, the Court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion regarding the MySpace evidence, because trial judges have “discretion to determine the scope of the cross-examination of a witness” (quoting People v. Corby, 6 NY3d 231, 234 [2005]). The trial court gave the defendant some leeway in portraying the nature of the material on the daughter’s MySpace account and the conflict that arose between them over the postings. The Court reasoned that it was obvious that the MySpace postings caused considerable friction between the defendant and his daughter, and that she resented his parental intrusion.
Third, the Court determined there was no abuse of discretion in the exclusion of evidence regarding the daughter’s clothing. The court permitted testimony regarding the controversy over the daughter’s attire and the defendant’s negative reaction to her clothing choices. The Court stated that the precise types of clothing were unnecessary to further the motive defense.
The Court concluded the trial judge gave the defendant sufficient latitude to develop his theory that his older daughter had substantial reasons to fabricate either to put an end to the defendant’s parental interference or to avoid being sent to an institution for troubled youths. The Court concluded: “Defendant was therefore able to present evidence reflecting his parental concern over his daughter’s inappropriate and risky behavior, which he claimed provoked his daughter’s motivation to lie about his conduct. As such, there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s exclusion of the challenged evidence.”