People v. Hernandez, 22 N.Y.3d 894 (2013)
A court has the inherent power to correct its records to reflect the true intention behind a sentence, especially when the initial sentence is ambiguous, and such correction does not violate double jeopardy principles if the defendant has not fully served the intended sentence and thus has no legitimate expectation of finality.
Summary
Hernandez was initially convicted of driving while intoxicated and sentenced to probation and 60 days in jail. After violating probation, the court intended to sentence him to an additional 60 days. However, the sentencing pronouncement was ambiguous. He was briefly incarcerated but released due to a clerical error. The court then resentenced him to 120 days, clarifying that it was an additional 60 days. The New York Court of Appeals held that the resentencing did not violate CPL § 430.10 or the Double Jeopardy Clause because the initial sentence was ambiguous, and Hernandez had not completed the intended sentence, precluding a reasonable expectation of finality.
Facts
Hernandez was convicted of driving while intoxicated. As part of his sentence, he received three years of probation and a 60-day jail term.
He violated a condition of his probation. The District Court stated its intention to impose an additional 60 days of incarceration.
At the resentencing hearing, the court sentenced him to “60 days in jail” without explicitly stating it was an *additional* 60 days. Hernandez was briefly taken into custody but released the same day due to an error crediting him with time already served.
Upon discovering the error, the District Court resentenced Hernandez to “120 days in jail which is an additional 60 days to the 60 days sentence that he already served.”
Procedural History
The District Court resentenced Hernandez after he was mistakenly released.
Hernandez appealed, arguing that the resentencing violated CPL § 430.10 and the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The Appellate Term’s order was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether the resentencing of Hernandez violated Criminal Procedure Law § 430.10, which generally prohibits changing a sentence of imprisonment once its term has commenced.
Whether the resentencing of Hernandez violated his constitutional right against double jeopardy under the Fifth Amendment.
Holding
No, because the court has inherent power to correct clerical errors and clarify ambiguities in sentencing, particularly when the correction aligns with the court’s original intent.
No, because under the specific facts of this case the resentencing did not violate double jeopardy principles because Hernandez’s initial sentence was ambiguous and he had not served the full, intended sentence, and therefore had no reasonable expectation of finality.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals relied on the well-established principle that courts have the inherent power to correct their records to reflect the truth, especially regarding clerical errors or mistakes made during sentencing. Quoting People v. Minaya, the court noted the power to correct errors “in order to conform the record to the truth.” The court found the initial sentence ambiguous because it did not explicitly state that the 60 days was *in addition* to the previously served time.
The court distinguished this case from People v. Williams, where resentencing to include post-release supervision (PRS) after the defendants had fully served their original sentences was deemed a double jeopardy violation. In Williams, the original sentences were unambiguous and fully served, creating a legitimate expectation of finality. Here, the ambiguity of the sentence and Hernandez’s failure to complete the intended term of imprisonment prevented such an expectation from arising. The court stated, “Under these circumstances, no reasonable expectation of finality could have attached to the ambiguous sentence so that the court would be precluded, under principles of double jeopardy, from correcting its ambiguity and resentencing defendant in accordance with its stated intent”.
The decision emphasizes that the key factor is whether the defendant had a legitimate expectation of finality in the original sentence. Because the sentence was ambiguous and the defendant was released in error, no such expectation could have arisen.