People v. Gause, 18 N.Y.3d 386 (2012)
When a jury is presented with inconsistent charges (intentional murder and depraved indifference murder) and convicts on one, that verdict implies an acquittal on the other, barring retrial on the latter under double jeopardy principles, even without an explicit acquittal.
Summary
Gause was initially convicted of depraved indifference murder. The Appellate Division reversed this conviction due to insufficient evidence and ordered a new trial for intentional murder. Gause was then convicted of intentional murder. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the second trial violated double jeopardy. Because the first jury had the opportunity to convict on either intentional or depraved indifference murder, its conviction on the latter implied an acquittal on the former. Since these crimes are inconsistent, a guilty verdict on one necessitates a not-guilty verdict on the other.
Facts
Following a dispute, Gause and an accomplice followed the victim. The accomplice shot the victim, and Gause struck the victim with a metal pole. The victim died from his injuries. Gause was charged with intentional murder, depraved indifference murder, and intentional assault.
Procedural History
The trial court instructed the jury that they could only convict Gause of one of the murder charges. The jury convicted Gause of depraved indifference murder. The Appellate Division reversed, finding insufficient evidence for depraved indifference murder, dismissed that charge, and ordered a new trial on the intentional murder charge. Gause was convicted of intentional murder in the second trial, and the Appellate Division affirmed, citing the law of the case. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
- Whether double jeopardy bars retrial on an intentional murder charge after the defendant was initially convicted of depraved indifference murder, where the jury was instructed to consider the charges in the alternative and could only convict on one.
Holding
- Yes, because the first jury had a full opportunity to return a verdict on both inconsistent charges, and its conviction on depraved indifference murder impliedly acquitted Gause of intentional murder.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals emphasized that the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions protect against being tried twice for the same offense after an acquittal or conviction. Quoting In re Nielsen, the court noted the principle of “implied acquittal,” where a failure to convict when conviction was possible suggests acquittal. The court found that the first jury had the opportunity to convict on intentional murder but convicted on depraved indifference murder instead. It emphasized that intentional murder and depraved indifference murder are inconsistent charges under New York law: “guilt of one necessarily negates guilt of the other” (citing People v. Gallagher, 69 NY2d 525, 529 [1987]). The court reasoned that because the jury sought clarification on both charges and then convicted on depraved indifference murder, they necessarily rejected the intentional murder theory. Therefore, the retrial on the intentional murder charge was barred by double jeopardy. The court distinguished People v. Jackson, 20 NY2d 440 (1967), noting that it didn’t involve inconsistent counts where guilt of one necessarily negates guilt of the other. The court concluded that the indictment must be dismissed because no charges remain unconsidered.