Dombrowski v. Bulson, 19 N.Y.3d 347 (2012)
In legal malpractice actions, even those arising from criminal proceedings, recovery is limited to pecuniary damages; nonpecuniary damages, such as those for loss of liberty, are not recoverable.
Summary
Dombrowski sued his former criminal defense attorney, Bulson, for legal malpractice after his conviction for attempted rape and related charges was vacated on habeas corpus due to ineffective assistance of counsel. Dombrowski sought nonpecuniary damages for the loss of liberty during his incarceration. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that nonpecuniary damages are not recoverable in legal malpractice actions, even when the malpractice arises from a criminal case and results in imprisonment. The Court emphasized that allowing such recovery would negatively impact the defense bar and the criminal justice system.
Facts
Dombrowski was convicted of attempted rape, sexual abuse, and endangering the welfare of a child in 2000. He was incarcerated from January 17, 2001, until July 19, 2006, and then served a period of post-release supervision. Dombrowski filed a motion to vacate his conviction, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel by Bulson, his trial attorney, which was denied. He subsequently sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, which was conditionally granted based on errors by defense counsel that affected the victim’s credibility. The indictment was eventually dismissed, and Dombrowski was not re-prosecuted.
Procedural History
Dombrowski sued Bulson for legal malpractice in Supreme Court, which granted summary judgment to Bulson, dismissing the complaint. The Appellate Division modified the Supreme Court’s order, reinstating the portion of the complaint seeking nonpecuniary damages. The Appellate Division granted Bulson leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals, certifying the question of whether its order was properly made.
Issue(s)
Whether a plaintiff, suing his former criminal defense attorney for legal malpractice, can recover nonpecuniary damages for loss of liberty resulting from wrongful conviction and incarceration.
Holding
No, because New York law limits recovery in legal malpractice actions to pecuniary damages, and policy considerations weigh against expanding recovery to include nonpecuniary damages in criminal legal malpractice cases.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reasoned that to recover damages in a legal malpractice action, a plaintiff must establish that the attorney failed to exercise reasonable skill and knowledge, and that this breach proximately caused actual and ascertainable pecuniary damages. For criminal legal malpractice, the plaintiff must have a colorable claim of actual innocence. New York courts have generally rejected claims for nonpecuniary damages in legal malpractice actions arising from civil proceedings. The Court acknowledged the argument that limiting recovery to pecuniary damages in criminal malpractice cases would deny meaningful relief but found this to be a policy decision. The Court distinguished criminal legal malpractice from intentional torts like false arrest and malicious prosecution, where nonpecuniary damages are recoverable because those torts involve deliberate conduct, whereas legal malpractice is based on a failure to exercise skill or care. The Court emphasized policy considerations, stating that allowing nonpecuniary damages would have “negative and, at worst, devastating consequences for the criminal justice system,” potentially chilling the willingness of the defense bar to represent indigent defendants and incentivizing attorneys not to participate in post-conviction efforts to overturn wrongful convictions. The court stated “as a matter of settled law, tort liability is predicated on the nature of the act of the tort-feasor, not simply the injury of the victim”.