18 N.Y.3d 647 (2012)
The Freedom of Information Law’s (FOIL) inter-agency and intra-agency exemption, which protects predecisional deliberative materials, does not extend to communications between a New York state agency and a federal agency because the statutory definition of “agency” is limited to state and municipal entities.
Summary
The Town of Waterford sought information from the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) regarding the Hudson River dredging project, particularly concerning alternative water supplies due to PCB contamination. The DEC denied access to certain records exchanged with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), claiming the inter-agency exemption under FOIL. The New York Court of Appeals held that the inter-agency exemption does not apply to communications with federal agencies, as the FOIL statute defines “agency” as state or municipal entities only. The court emphasized FOIL’s policy of open government and narrow interpretation of exemptions, ordering the release of the withheld documents.
Facts
The EPA placed a 200-mile portion of the Hudson River on the National Priorities List in 1984 due to PCB contamination.
The EPA, DEC, and New York State Department of Health (DOH) collaborated on addressing the contamination, with the EPA as the lead agency.
In 2002, the EPA approved a remediation plan requiring dredging, and General Electric (GE) was directed to prepare a “Water Supply Options Analysis” for the Towns of Waterford and Halfmoon.
The Town of Waterford subsequently made a FOIL request to DEC seeking documents related to alternative water supplies, PCB levels, and modifications to regulations governing PCB exposure, along with materials related to GE’s analysis.
Procedural History
The DEC provided some documents but withheld others, citing the inter-agency or intra-agency exemption and other state/federal law exemptions.
The Town commenced a CPLR Article 78 proceeding challenging the withholding.
Supreme Court directed disclosure of additional records, finding the EPA was not an “agency” under the Public Officers Law.
The Appellate Division modified, holding that communications between federal and state agencies could be considered deliberative material subject to exemption, and remitted for in camera review.
Supreme Court then concluded the records qualified as exempt deliberative material.
The Town appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether communications with the EPA, a federal agency, fall within the inter-agency or intra-agency exemption for predecisional materials under Public Officers Law § 87(2)(g).
Holding
No, because the statutory definition of “agency” in the Public Officers Law is explicitly limited to state and municipal entities, and does not include federal agencies like the EPA.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals emphasized that FOIL is based on the principle that “the public is vested with an inherent right to know and that official secrecy is anathematic to our form of government.” Therefore, FOIL must be liberally construed, and its exemptions narrowly interpreted.
The statute defines “agency” as “any state or municipal department, board, bureau, division, commission, committee, public authority, public corporation, council, office or other governmental entity performing a governmental or proprietary function for the state or any one or more municipalities thereof, except the judiciary or the state legislature” (Public Officers Law § 86 [3]).
The Court rejected the DEC’s argument that the definition of “agency” should not apply to the phrases “inter-agency” and “intra-agency,” finding no indication of legislative intent to treat the term differently.
While acknowledging the collaborative relationship between the EPA and DEC, the Court distinguished the EPA from an outside consultant retained by an agency. The Court noted the EPA was the lead agency and represented different constituencies, whose interests may diverge.
The Court cited the Committee on Open Government’s opinion that the EPA cannot be characterized as a consultant “retained” by the DEC and that the definition of “agency” does not include federal agencies.
The Court concluded that the DEC failed to meet its burden of proving that the requested material fell within the statutory exemption. “It would make little sense to protect the deliberative process when such reports are prepared by agency employees yet deny this protection when reports are prepared for the same purpose by outside consultants retained by agencies”.