18 N.Y.3d 400 (2012)
In defamation cases, New York courts narrowly construe what constitutes transacting business within the state for the purpose of establishing long-arm jurisdiction over non-domiciliaries under CPLR 302(a)(1), requiring a substantial relationship between the defendant’s purposeful in-state activities and the defamatory statements.
Summary
This case concerns whether New York courts had personal jurisdiction over an Ohio-based collie association (AWCA) and its Vermont-resident president for allegedly defamatory statements posted on the AWCA’s website. The SPCA of Upstate New York argued that the defendants’ limited activities in New York, including visits and donations related to rescued dogs, were sufficient to establish jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals held that the defendants’ contacts were too limited and the connection to the defamatory statements too tangential to justify exercising long-arm jurisdiction, emphasizing the need to avoid chilling free speech without a clear nexus between in-state business transactions and the defamatory statements.
Facts
The SPCA of Upstate New York rescued 23 dogs. Jean Levitt, president of the Ohio-based AWCA, contacted the SPCA to offer assistance. The AWCA donated $1,000 and collars/leashes. Levitt visited the SPCA twice in New York (totaling under 3 hours) to deliver items and check on the dogs. After the visits, Levitt posted statements on the AWCA website criticizing the SPCA’s care of the dogs. The SPCA then sued AWCA and Levitt for defamation, claiming the online statements were false and damaging.
Procedural History
The Supreme Court initially denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding sufficient purposeful availment. The Appellate Division reversed, granting the motion to dismiss, holding that the contacts with New York were insufficient to support personal jurisdiction in a defamation case. The New York Court of Appeals then affirmed the Appellate Division’s ruling.
Issue(s)
Whether the defendants’ activities in New York constituted transacting business within the state under CPLR 302(a)(1), such that New York courts could exercise long-arm jurisdiction over them in a defamation action arising from statements posted online after the activities concluded.
Holding
No, because the defendants’ limited activities in New York were not sufficiently related to the cause of action for defamation; thus, the required substantial relationship between the business transacted and the claim asserted was absent.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court reasoned that while CPLR 302 allows for long-arm jurisdiction based on transacting business within the state, defamation claims require a closer examination. The Court noted that defamation claims are explicitly excluded from the “tortious act” provisions of CPLR 302(a)(2) and (3). To establish jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1) in a defamation case, there must be “purposeful activities” within the state and “some articulable nexus” or a “substantial relationship” between those activities and the cause of action. The court found the defendants’ activities—phone calls, brief visits, and donations—were limited and aimed at assisting the dogs, not at gathering information for the defamatory statements. The statements were written and posted after Levitt returned to Vermont, and were accessible everywhere, not particularly directed at New York. The Court emphasized that it construes “transacts any business within the state more narrowly in defamation cases.” The court cited Best Van Lines, Inc. v Walker, 490 F.3d 239, 248 (2d Cir 2007). It stated that CPLR 302 reflects a legislative intention to treat defamation differently to avoid chilling free speech. The dissent argued the AWCA purposely availed itself of conducting activities in New York when it offered its services to the SPCA, and those activities were substantially related to the allegedly defamatory statements. The majority found that the connection between the activities and the defamatory statements was too “tangential” to support jurisdiction.