People v. Thomas, 15 N.Y.3d 924 (2010)

Evidence of an eyewitness’s identification of a codefendant, who is not on trial, is admissible to bolster the witness’s in-court identification of the defendant if it is probative of the witness’s ability to accurately observe and identify the perpetrators of the crime.

Summary

The New York Court of Appeals held that testimony regarding a witness’s showup identification of a codefendant was admissible to support the accuracy of the witness’s in-court identification of the defendant. The court distinguished this case from prior rulings that restricted third-party testimony about pretrial identifications. Here, the eyewitness himself testified about identifying both the defendant and the codefendant, whose possession of the stolen cell phone made the identification highly relevant. The court reasoned that the witness’s accurate identification of the codefendant was probative of the witness’s overall ability to observe and recall the events of the robbery, thus bolstering the reliability of his identification of the defendant.

Facts

Oscar Magallanes was robbed by two men outside his apartment. The well-lit landing allowed Magallanes to clearly see the faces of his attackers. Police officers nearby noticed Daniel Thomas and Victor Cruz running from the scene. Cruz was found with Magallanes’s cell phone and cash. Magallanes identified both Thomas and Cruz in a showup. Prior to trial, the showup identification of Thomas was suppressed as fruit of an illegal arrest. However, Magallanes was permitted to identify Thomas in court based on an independent source.

Procedural History

Thomas was convicted of robbery in the second degree. He appealed, arguing that the evidence of Magallanes’s showup identification of Cruz was inadmissible. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, finding any error harmless. A dissenting justice granted Thomas leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

Whether testimony concerning an eyewitness’s pretrial identification of a codefendant, who is not on trial, is admissible to bolster the witness’s in-court identification of the defendant.

Holding

Yes, because the eyewitness’s accuracy in identifying the person who possessed the stolen property (the codefendant) was relevant to the eyewitness’s ability to observe and accurately identify the other attacker (the defendant) at trial.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from People v. Monroe, which involved improper bolstering of identification by a third party. Here, the eyewitness himself testified about the identification. The court also distinguished this case from the Trowbridge rule, which prohibits third-party testimony about a witness’s prior identification of a defendant. The Court emphasized that the concerns underlying Trowbridge—namely, the improper bolstering of an identification by a third party—were not present. The court stated that “[t]he repetition of an identification by a third party may ‘improperly influence the jury’s belief in the reliability of the identification…The testimony of the third party is not probative of whether the defendant was the person who committed the crime, but it could at best establish that the eyewitness, prior to trial, identified the defendant in the presence of others’ (People v Bolden, 58 NY2d 741, 743 [1982, Gabrielli, J., concurring]).”

Instead, Magallanes’s testimony concerning his identification of Cruz was probative of whether Thomas had attacked Magallanes. This is because Magallanes’s accuracy in identifying the person who, it turned out, had his cell phone was relevant to whether the conditions on the landing at 124 East 103rd Street were conducive to observing the other attacker and accurately identifying him at trial. The Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony, because “Magallanes’s accuracy in identifying the person who, it turned out, had his cell phone was relevant to whether the conditions on the landing at 124 East 103rd Street were conducive to observing the other attacker and accurately identifying him at trial.” Thus, the testimony was deemed relevant and admissible.