People v. Santiago, 17 N.Y.3d 661 (2011)

In cases that hinge on eyewitness identification, expert testimony on the reliability of such identifications should be admitted when there is little or no corroborating evidence, and the testimony concerns relevant, generally accepted scientific principles beyond the ken of the average juror.

Summary

Edwin Santiago was convicted of assault based largely on eyewitness identification. The trial court denied Santiago’s request to present expert testimony on factors affecting eyewitness reliability. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion. The Court emphasized that when a case relies heavily on eyewitness testimony and lacks corroborating evidence, expert testimony on eyewitness identification is crucial to educate the jury about potential pitfalls in eyewitness memory and perception. The Court outlined a two-stage inquiry for determining admissibility: (1) whether the case turns on eyewitness accuracy with little corroboration and (2) relevance, general acceptance in the scientific community, qualification of the expert, and whether the testimony is beyond the ken of the average juror.

Facts

A woman was attacked at a subway station. The assailant’s face was partially concealed. The victim described the assailant to police. Two other witnesses, Edwin Rios and Pablo Alarcon, also saw the assailant. Police created a sketch based on the victim’s description. Alarcon saw the assailant put away a knife. Nine days later, police arrested Edwin Santiago for selling Metrocard swipes. The victim identified Santiago in a photo array and a lineup. Alarcon initially claimed he didn’t recognize anyone in the photo array but later identified Santiago with 80% confidence. Rios identified Santiago in a lineup after the initial trial motion.

Procedural History

Santiago was indicted for first-degree assault. He moved to introduce expert testimony on eyewitness identification, which was denied by the trial court without a Frye hearing. After a suppression hearing, Santiago was convicted of assault. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Santiago’s motion to admit expert testimony on eyewitness identification when the case turned on the accuracy of a single eyewitness identification.

2. Whether the subsequent identifications by Rios and Alarcon constituted sufficient corroborating evidence to negate the need for expert testimony on eyewitness identification.

Holding

1. Yes, because the proposed expert testimony concerned relevant, generally accepted scientific principles beyond the ken of the average juror, and the case initially rested solely on the victim’s identification.

2. No, because the corroborating identifications were not sufficiently reliable to obviate the need for expert testimony, given that Alarcon’s identification was uncertain and potentially tainted, and Rios’s identification may have been influenced by the police sketch.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals applied the two-stage inquiry established in People v. LeGrand. Initially, the case turned on the victim’s identification alone. The Court emphasized the importance of expert testimony in cases where eyewitness identification is crucial and lacks corroboration, citing People v. Drake, 7 N.Y.3d 28, 31 (2006) (“courts are encouraged … in appropriate cases” to grant defendants’ motions to admit expert testimony on this subject). The Court found that testimony concerning the lack of correlation between confidence and accuracy, confidence malleability, and the effects of post-event information was relevant and beyond the ken of the average juror, citing People v. Abney, 13 N.Y.3d 251 (2009) and LeGrand. “Trial error is only harmless when there is overwhelming proof of the defendant’s guilt and no significant probability that the jury would have acquitted the defendant were it not for the error” People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 242 (1975). The Court distinguished People v. Allen, 13 N.Y.3d 251 (2009), where a second, highly reliable eyewitness identification existed. Here, the corroborating identifications were questionable. The Court held that the trial court should have considered testimony on unconscious transference, given that Alarcon and Rios had seen images of Santiago before identifying him. The Court stated that the errors were not harmless because proof of defendant’s guilt was not overwhelming. The Court reversed the order and ordered a new trial.