People v. Santiago, 17 N.Y.3d 247 (2011)
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An offender who applies for resentencing under the 2009 Drug Law Reform Act (DLRA) while incarcerated remains eligible for resentencing even if released on parole before a decision is rendered on the application.
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Summary
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The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether an inmate who applied for resentencing under the 2009 Drug Law Reform Act (DLRA) while incarcerated, but was subsequently released on parole before the application was decided, remained eligible for resentencing. The Court held that the plain language of the statute requires only that the applicant be in custody at the time of application, not at the time of decision. To rule otherwise could encourage manipulation and arbitrary outcomes based on the timing of parole release. The Court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case for further proceedings.
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Facts
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Defendant was sentenced to 4 ½ to 9 years in prison for a 2003 drug transaction. On November 25, 2009, she applied for resentencing under the 2009 DLRA. Prior to a ruling on her application, she was released on parole on December 3, 2009.
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Procedural History
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Supreme Court denied the defendant’s application for resentencing. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that because the defendant was no longer in custody, she was ineligible for resentencing. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
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Issue(s)
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Whether an offender who applies for resentencing under the 2009 Drug Law Reform Act while incarcerated, but is released on parole before the application is decided, remains eligible for resentencing under the statute.
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Holding
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Yes, because the 2009 DLRA requires only that an offender be in custody at the time of application, not at the time the application is decided.
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Court’s Reasoning
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The Court focused on the plain language of CPL 440.46(1), which, as originally enacted, stated that any person in the custody of the Department of Correctional Services convicted of a class B felony drug offense prior to January 13, 2005, and serving an indeterminate sentence with a maximum term of more than three years, “may … apply to be resentenced.” The Court reasoned that the statute only explicitly requires the applicant to be in custody when the application is filed; it does not mandate continued custody until the application’s resolution.
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While acknowledging the argument that the Legislature primarily intended the DLRA’s benefits for incarcerated offenders facing the harshest consequences of severe sentences, the Court found that imposing a continued custody requirement would lead to undesirable consequences. Specifically, it could incentivize “gamesmanship, and unnecessarily arbitrary results” as parties and judges might attempt to manipulate the timing of decisions based on parole release prospects. The Court opted for a straightforward interpretation of the statute’s text.
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The Court also distinguished the availability of parole sentence termination under Executive Law § 259-j, noting that it does not negate the right to be considered for resentencing under the DLRA if the statutory requirements are met. The Court concluded that reading the statute as written best serves the interests of justice and avoids potential manipulation of the legal process. As stated by the court, “We conclude that it is best to read the statute as it is written. We hold that it applies to an offender who was in prison at the time she made her application, even though she was paroled before the application was decided.”