People v. Pacquette, 17 N.Y.3d 87 (2011): Indelible Right to Counsel and Attorney’s Affirmative Action

17 N.Y.3d 87 (2011)

An attorney’s instruction to police not to question a defendant is ineffective to invoke the indelible right to counsel on an unrelated charge when the attorney’s representation is explicitly limited to a separate matter and the defendant has not otherwise invoked the right to counsel.

Summary

Dean Pacquette was arrested for a drug crime in Manhattan while being a suspect in a Brooklyn homicide. While waiting for arraignment on the drug charge, an attorney, Daniel Scott, was assigned to represent him on the drug charge. Detectives from Brooklyn transported Pacquette back to Brooklyn where he confessed to the homicide after waiving his Miranda rights. Pacquette moved to suppress his confession arguing that his right to counsel had been violated because Scott had instructed the detectives not to question him. The court of appeals held that the confession was admissible because Scott’s representation was limited to the drug charge and Pacquette had not otherwise invoked his right to counsel in the homicide investigation. The court emphasized that an attorney cannot unilaterally create an attorney-client relationship to trigger the indelible right to counsel.

Facts

Pacquette was a suspect in a Brooklyn homicide. He was arrested in Manhattan on drug charges.

Detectives transported Pacquette from Manhattan to Brooklyn for a lineup, where he was identified by eyewitnesses.

While waiting for arraignment on the Manhattan drug charges, attorney Daniel Scott was assigned to represent Pacquette on the drug charges.

Scott met with Pacquette in the presence of the detectives. Accounts differed as to what was said, but Scott conceded he was only representing Pacquette on the drug charge.

After arraignment on the drug charge, Pacquette was transported back to Brooklyn where he confessed to the homicide after waiving his Miranda rights.

Procedural History

Pacquette was indicted for second-degree murder, second-degree assault, and weapon possession.

He moved to suppress his statements, arguing a violation of his right to counsel. The motion was denied.

Pacquette was convicted of a weapon charge and acquitted of intentional murder.

The Appellate Division vacated the sentence and remitted for resentencing, but otherwise affirmed the conviction, deeming any error in admitting the statements harmless.

The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

Issue(s)

Whether an attorney’s instruction to police not to question a defendant triggers the indelible right to counsel on an unrelated charge, when the attorney’s representation is explicitly limited to a separate matter and the defendant has not otherwise invoked the right to counsel.

Holding

No, because an attorney cannot unilaterally create an attorney-client relationship to trigger the indelible right to counsel when their representation is explicitly limited to a separate matter, and the defendant has not otherwise invoked the right to counsel.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court distinguished this case from People v. Ramos (40 N.Y.2d 610 (1976)), where the attorney’s actions in open court were directly related to the interrogation about to commence on the shooting charge. Here, Scott made no statements during the arraignment even arguably related to the homicide.

The Court emphasized that Pacquette’s conduct did not suggest that he meant to invoke his right to counsel before he made the statements. It further distinguished People v. Marrero (51 N.Y.2d 56 (1980)), noting that Scott had not already conspicuously represented Pacquette in an aspect of the homicide matter.

The Court rejected the argument that Scott’s failure to “specify” whether he represented Pacquette in “the drug case or the homicide case or both” created an ambiguity that caused the indelible right to counsel to attach. The Court stated, “We have never held that an attorney may unilaterally create an attorney-client relationship in a criminal proceeding in this fashion, and decline to do so now.”

The dissent argued that Scott’s directives unambiguously communicated that Pacquette was not to discuss any legal matter with the detectives, and that the context made clear that Scott’s concern was the Brooklyn homicide. The dissent emphasized that the detectives were aware that Pacquette was a suspect in the Brooklyn homicide and that he was to be immediately returned to their custody for arraignment on homicide charges. The dissent also argued that, even if there were ambiguity, the burden was on the prosecution to ensure that Pacquette’s right to counsel was protected.