17 N.Y.3d 58 (2011)
The unauthorized use of a vehicle statute is violated when a person enters a vehicle without permission and takes actions that interfere with or are detrimental to the owner’s possession or use of the vehicle, even if the vehicle is not moved or operated.
Summary
Robert Franov was convicted of unauthorized use of a vehicle in the second degree after police officers found him exiting a damaged Lincoln Town Car with a stolen part. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s vacatur of the conviction, holding that Franov’s actions constituted unauthorized use because he entered the car without permission and vandalized it, interfering with the owner’s use of the vehicle. The court clarified that the statute encompasses conduct beyond mere “joyriding” and includes actions that negatively impact the owner’s possession, even if the vehicle is not driven.
Facts
On November 28, 2006, police officers observed Robert Franov exiting a Lincoln Town Car holding a computerized automobile light control module. The car’s driver-side door lock was broken, and the dashboard was ripped apart, exposing wiring. Franov did not own the car and lacked permission to use it. Officers recovered a screwdriver, ratchet, and sockets from Franov’s pocket after he was arrested.
Procedural History
Franov was indicted on multiple charges, including unauthorized use of a vehicle in the second degree. A jury convicted him on all counts. The Appellate Division modified the judgment, vacating the unauthorized use conviction. The Court of Appeals granted the People leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether the evidence presented at trial was legally sufficient to prove that Franov “exercised control over” or “otherwise used” the vehicle without authorization, as required for a conviction of unauthorized use of a vehicle in the second degree.
Holding
Yes, because Franov’s unauthorized entry into the vehicle, coupled with acts of vandalism and theft of a part, interfered with the owner’s possession and use of the vehicle, thus satisfying the elements of unauthorized use under Penal Law § 165.05(1).
Court’s Reasoning
The Court analyzed the evolution of the unauthorized use statute, contrasting it with its predecessor, former Penal Law § 1293-a, which was narrowly construed to apply primarily to instances of “joyriding.” The current statute, Penal Law § 165.05, broadens the prohibited conduct to include exercising control over or otherwise using a vehicle without permission. The Court referred to People v. McCaleb, 25 N.Y.2d 394 (1969), which held that the statute prohibits a broader range of conduct than its predecessor. The court stated, “The exercise of control is not limited to a moving vehicle…Thus barring the owner or others from entry into the car might constitute such control, as might the temporary use of the vehicle, or its motor, for a purpose accomplished while the vehicle remains or has become stationary.”
The Court rejected the argument that operability is essential for an unauthorized use conviction. Instead, the court stated that “a violation of the statute occurs when a person enters an automobile without permission and takes actions that interfere with or are detrimental to the owner’s possession or use of the vehicle.” Franov’s actions, including breaking into the car, damaging the interior, and stealing the light control module, met this standard. The dissent argued that the statute should only apply when the defendant has the ability and intent to operate the vehicle, but the majority found this interpretation too narrow and inconsistent with the statute’s language and legislative intent.