People v. Scott, 15 N.Y.3d 590 (2010)
New York’s Rape Shield Law (CPL 60.42) generally prohibits evidence of a victim’s sexual conduct, but a trial court has discretion to admit such evidence if it is relevant and admissible in the interests of justice; furthermore, a trial court has discretion in ruling on challenges for cause regarding jurors.
Summary
This case concerns the admissibility of evidence of a victim’s sexual conduct under New York’s Rape Shield Law and challenges for cause during jury selection. The defendant was convicted of rape in the second degree and endangering the welfare of a child. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial court did not err in precluding certain evidence of the victim’s sexual conduct and in its rulings regarding jury selection, finding no abuse of discretion. The court emphasized the importance of protecting victims from harassment and confusion of jurors, while also recognizing the court’s role in ensuring an impartial jury.
Facts
K.D., a minor, attended a party where she consumed alcohol and marijuana. She later claimed to have had intercourse with both Steven A. and the defendant, Scott. Initially, she only accused Steven A., but later accused the defendant of rape. At trial, K.D. testified that the defendant raped her. Another attendee, A.B., testified that K.D. was crying and wearing only a sheet after being alone with the defendant. The defense sought to introduce evidence of K.D.’s sexual activity with Steven A. to explain her emotional state, but the trial court largely prohibited this evidence.
Procedural History
The defendant was charged with rape in the first degree (forcible), rape in the second degree (statutory), and endangering the welfare of a child. The County Court initially granted the defendant’s motion to introduce evidence of K.D.’s sexual conduct but later reversed its decision. The jury acquitted the defendant of first-degree rape but convicted him of second-degree rape and endangering the welfare of a child. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and the case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
1. Whether the trial court erred in precluding evidence of the victim’s sexual conduct with another person around the time of the alleged rape, pursuant to CPL 60.42 (5)?
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in its rulings regarding the disqualification and retention of jurors?
Holding
1. No, because the trial court appropriately applied CPL 60.42 (5) and the evidence’s relevance was contingent on the People introducing evidence of bruising, which they did not do.
2. No, because the trial court’s actions were within its discretion under CPL 270.15 (4) and CPL 270.20, and leaning towards disqualification of a potentially biased juror is permissible.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Rape Shield Law, CPL 60.42, generally prohibits the introduction of evidence of a victim’s sexual conduct in sex offense prosecutions to protect victims from harassment and prevent juror confusion. The court acknowledged that CPL 60.42 (5) allows for an exception “in the interests of justice,” but emphasized that this discretion should be exercised cautiously. The court found that the trial court’s decision to preclude evidence of K.D.’s sexual activity with Steven A. was appropriate because the People did not introduce evidence of bruising caused by sexual contact and attributed to the defendant, which was the basis upon which the defense argued for admissibility.
Regarding jury selection, the court cited CPL 270.15 (4) and CPL 270.20, which govern challenges for cause. The court acknowledged the trial court’s failure to make a probing inquiry of the sworn juror who expressed reservations about the lack of DNA evidence. However, the court stated that discharging this juror was authorized and proper under CPL 270.15(4). The Court also noted that a trial court should err on the side of disqualifying a prospective juror of dubious impartiality, quoting People v. Branch, 46 NY2d 645, 651 (1979): “trial court should lean toward disqualifying a prospective juror of dubious impartiality, rather than testing the bounds of discretion by permitting such a juror to serve”. The court found no error in refusing to disqualify the other prospective juror, citing People v. Provenzano, 50 NY2d 420 (1980), because the relationship between the prosecutor and that juror was distant in time and limited in nature.