Acosta v. New York City Department of Education, 16 N.Y.3d 309 (2011)
Under New York Correction Law § 753, a public employer must thoroughly consider all statutory factors, including evidence of rehabilitation, when determining whether to deny employment to an applicant with a prior criminal conviction based on the “unreasonable risk” exception.
Summary
The New York Court of Appeals held that the New York City Department of Education (DOE) acted arbitrarily in denying petitioner Acosta’s application for security clearance. Acosta, who had a prior conviction for robbery committed when she was 17, had otherwise demonstrated significant rehabilitation. The Court found that the DOE failed to adequately consider all factors outlined in Correction Law § 753, specifically information related to her rehabilitation and good conduct, when determining if employing her would pose an unreasonable risk. The Court emphasized the importance of considering all submitted documentation and reversed the denial of Acosta’s application.
Facts
In 1993, Acosta was convicted of first-degree robbery at the age of 17 and served over three years in prison. After parole in 1996, she earned a Bachelor’s degree, volunteered to assist inmates, and held responsible positions at two law firms. In 2006, she took a part-time clerical position at the Cooke Center for Learning and Development, a non-profit providing preschool special education services under contract with the DOE. Three months after starting, she was asked to be fingerprinted for DOE security clearance, having previously disclosed her conviction to Cooke Center.
Procedural History
The DOE denied Acosta’s application based on the “unreasonable risk” exception due to her prior conviction, leading to the termination of her employment at the Cooke Center. Acosta then filed a petition against the DOE and the Cooke Center, among others. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the DOE acted arbitrarily and remanded for a remedy. The Appellate Division then certified a question to the Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether the New York City Department of Education acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it denied Acosta’s application for security clearance based on a prior robbery conviction, without adequately considering all factors outlined in Correction Law § 753, including evidence of rehabilitation and good conduct.
Holding
Yes, because the DOE failed to demonstrate that it considered all of the factors enumerated in Correction Law § 753 when determining whether the “unreasonable risk” exception applied, particularly the information produced by Acosta regarding her rehabilitation and good conduct.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals emphasized that while courts should not re-weigh the factors under Correction Law § 753, the DOE’s actions demonstrated a failure to consider all relevant factors. The DOE’s affidavit stated that Acosta “did not provide references from any previous employers,” but the DOE’s interview notice didn’t request those references and one of the references Acosta did provide noted that Cooke Center relied on “model references from past employers” when hiring her. This highlighted a larger issue: the DOE’s failure to consider all the documentation Acosta submitted regarding her rehabilitation. The Court noted that the Legislature has determined that it is unlawful for employers to deny employment based on prior convictions, and the exceptions to this rule require consideration of the factors listed in Correction Law § 753. The court pointed to the affidavit from the DOE’s Director stating that the DOE follows a “general policy” of closer review for first-time applicants with criminal histories, and stated that in light of the DOE’s failure to review all of Acosta’s documentation, this “closer review” appeared to be a pro forma denial, which is what the statute prohibits. As such, the DOE’s decision was deemed arbitrary and capricious because it did not comply with the Correction Law’s mandatory directive to consider all factors under § 753. However, the Court granted the Cooke Center’s motion to dismiss the petition against it, because the denial of clearance obligated Cooke Center to terminate her employment.