People v. Lopez, 16 N.Y.3d 375 (2011)
When circumstances suggest an incarcerated individual is likely represented by counsel on the custodial matter, police must inquire about their representational status before interrogating them on an unrelated matter.
Summary
The case concerns the scope of New York’s indelible right to counsel. Lopez, incarcerated in Pennsylvania on drug charges and represented by counsel there, was interrogated by a New York detective about a murder in Staten Island. Lopez waived his Miranda rights and made incriminating statements. The Court of Appeals held that because the detective should have reasonably suspected Lopez was represented in Pennsylvania, he had a duty to inquire about Lopez’s representational status. Failure to do so violated Lopez’s right to counsel, but the error was harmless due to overwhelming independent evidence of guilt.
Facts
Hamoud Thabeat was murdered in his Staten Island bodega. Based on information received, Detective Mattel interviewed several individuals who implicated Oilman Lopez in the murder. Mattel learned Lopez was incarcerated in Pennsylvania on a drug charge with a $10,000 bail. Mattel traveled to Pennsylvania, issued Miranda warnings to Lopez, and questioned him about the Staten Island murder. Lopez stated that he did not want to speak to an attorney regarding the New York case. Lopez then implicated another person, Alston, as the shooter. Unbeknownst to Mattel, Lopez was represented by counsel in Pennsylvania. Lopez later confessed to another inmate his role in the murder.
Procedural History
Lopez was indicted for murder and related charges in New York. He moved to suppress his confession, arguing a violation of his right to counsel. The Supreme Court denied the motion. Lopez was convicted after a jury trial. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed on different grounds, finding a right to counsel violation but deeming it harmless error.
Issue(s)
Whether, under New York’s indelible right to counsel rule, an interrogating officer has a duty to inquire about an incarcerated defendant’s representational status on the custodial matter when circumstances suggest it is likely the defendant is represented by counsel.
Holding
Yes, because an officer who wishes to question a person in police custody about an unrelated matter must make a reasonable inquiry concerning the defendant’s representational status when the circumstances indicate that there is a probable likelihood that an attorney has entered the custodial matter, and the accused is actually represented on the custodial charge.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court reasoned that New York’s right to counsel is a cherished protection. The Rogers rule prohibits questioning a defendant in custody represented by counsel unless the right is waived in counsel’s presence. The court extended the Rogers rule, finding that a detective must inquire about a defendant’s representational status when circumstances suggest the defendant is likely represented by counsel on the custodial charge. This protects individual rights and prevents deliberate indifference by police to circumvent Rogers. The Court emphasized that this holding doesn’t resurrect the discredited “derivative right to counsel” rule from Bartolomeo. Here, Mattel knew Lopez was incarcerated on a drug charge with bail set, indicating arraignment and a high likelihood of legal representation. Therefore, Mattel should have inquired about Lopez’s representational status. Although a right to counsel violation occurred, the Court deemed it harmless error because other evidence, including multiple confessions to acquaintances and forensic evidence, overwhelmingly proved Lopez’s guilt. The Court reasoned that Lopez’s jailhouse statement to Detective Mattel was, in a sense, partially exculpatory since he claimed that Alston murdered Thabeat and that he was merely a passive participant in the robbery gone awry. Since the jury found defendant guilty of shooting Thabeat, it necessarily disbelieved what he told Mattei and thereby diminished the importance of the improperly obtained statement in the overall context of the case.