People v. Lomax, 16 N.Y.3d 182 (2011)
When a subsequent indictment is related back to the commencement of the initial proceeding for speedy trial purposes, the excludable time from the initial proceeding also applies to the subsequent indictment.
Summary
Defendant was initially charged with assault via a desk appearance ticket. Over a year later, the People filed an indictment including theft-related charges stemming from the same incident. Defendant argued the theft charges should be dismissed on speedy trial grounds. The Court of Appeals held that because the subsequent indictment related back to the initial appearance for speedy trial commencement, the excludable time from the initial charges also applied to the theft charges. This prevents selective application of CPL 30.30 and ensures the speedy trial statute is applied as an integrated whole. The court affirmed the Appellate Division’s reinstatement of the theft-related counts.
Facts
The complainant was photographing a construction site when the defendant approached him, punched him, and stole his camera on August 18, 2005.
The police issued the defendant a desk appearance ticket for assault in the third degree.
The defendant appeared in Criminal Court on September 26, 2005, in response to the ticket.
About a month later, the People filed a misdemeanor complaint charging the defendant with assault, menacing, and harassment.
On November 8, 2006, the People filed an indictment charging the defendant with robbery, petit larceny, assault, grand larceny, criminal possession of stolen property, and menacing.
The People filed a statement of readiness on the same day as the indictment.
Procedural History
The defendant moved to dismiss the theft-related counts based on CPL 30.30 speedy trial grounds.
The Supreme Court denied the motion concerning the assault counts but granted it for the theft counts.
The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s order and reinstated the theft-related counts, finding the excludable time and the People’s statement of readiness applied to all charges since they arose from the same incident.
The Court of Appeals granted the defendant leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether the theft-related charges in the indictment, filed over a year after the initial accusatory instrument, are barred by the speedy trial provisions of CPL 30.30, specifically, whether the time excludable from the initial charges applies to the later theft-related charges.
Holding
No, because when a subsequent indictment is related back to the initial proceeding for purposes of applying the speedy trial statute, the excludable time is also related back.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals relied on its prior holding in People v. Sinistaj, 67 N.Y.2d 236 (1986), stating, “[w]e perceive no logical reason why, when a subsequent indictment is related back to the commencement of the proceeding for purposes of applying the six-month limitation prescribed by CPL 30.30 (1) (a), it should not also be related back for the purpose of computing the time to be excluded from that limitation.”
The Court reasoned that the provisions of CPL 30.30 should be interpreted as an integrated whole. The court emphasized that because both parties agreed the charges were sufficiently related to require the same commencement date, they are sufficiently related to apply the same excludable time.
The Court considered the meaning of “directly derived” under CPL 1.20(16)(b), stating that term should be accorded its plain meaning—specifically, whether the indictment can be traced to or originates from the prior accusatory instrument. In this case, the indictment appears to satisfy that test because the charges, including the theft-based charges, originate from the prior accusatory instrument, incorporating the same physical injury component.
The court stated that even if the indictment was not directly derived from the initial accusatory instrument, it would not benefit the defendant, because then the indictment would not relate back for the purpose of any speedy trial calculation, including determination of a commencement date. The speedy trial statute should be applied as a rational, integral whole.