Kabir v. County of Monroe, 16 N.Y.3d 217 (2011)
The reckless disregard standard of care in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e) applies only when the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle engages in conduct specifically exempted from the rules of the road by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(b); other injury-causing conduct is governed by ordinary negligence.
Summary
A deputy sheriff, responding to a burglary alarm, rear-ended the plaintiff’s vehicle while looking at his mobile data terminal to find cross streets. The plaintiff sued, alleging negligence. The defendants argued that the “reckless disregard” standard of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e) applied because the deputy was responding to an emergency. The Court of Appeals held that the reckless disregard standard applies only to conduct specifically privileged under § 1104(b) (e.g., speeding, running a red light). Because the deputy’s inattentive driving was not a privileged act under § 1104(b), the ordinary negligence standard applied. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s order granting partial summary judgment to the plaintiff on liability.
Facts
Deputy DiDomenico, while on routine patrol, received a dispatch to respond to a stolen vehicle report. He then received a second dispatch requesting backup for a burglary alarm, categorized as a high-priority call. While driving in traffic, DiDomenico looked down at his mobile data terminal for 2-3 seconds to view cross streets, as he was unfamiliar with the location. When he looked up, he realized traffic had slowed and he rear-ended Yasmin Kabir’s vehicle, which was stopped at a red light.
Procedural History
Kabir sued Monroe County and DiDomenico, alleging serious injury. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the reckless disregard standard applied. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The Appellate Division reversed, holding the reckless disregard standard applied only to conduct privileged under § 1104(b) and finding the deputy negligent. The Appellate Division granted the defendants leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether the reckless disregard standard of care in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e) applies to all injury-causing conduct of drivers of authorized emergency vehicles involved in emergency operations, or only to conduct specifically privileged under § 1104(b).
Holding
No, because the reckless disregard standard in § 1104(e) applies only to conduct privileged under § 1104(b). Other injury-causing conduct of a driver of an authorized emergency vehicle is governed by the principles of ordinary negligence.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court reasoned that § 1104(e) refers to “[t]he foregoing provisions,” which include the privileges listed in § 1104(b) (stopping/parking anywhere, proceeding past red lights/stop signs after slowing, exceeding speed limits, and disregarding regulations governing directions of movement). The Court rejected the argument that § 1104(e) creates a reckless disregard standard for all injury-causing conduct, even if not privileged. The court noted that the legislative history of § 1104 supports the view that the reckless disregard standard is limited to accidents caused by the exercise of a privilege identified in § 1104(b). The court clarified its prior decisions in Saarinen v. Kerr and Szczerbiak v. Pilat, stating that those cases addressed the meaning of the reckless disregard standard itself, not its applicability to conduct outside the scope of § 1104(b). The Court emphasized that if the conduct causing the accident is not privileged under § 1104(b), the standard of care is ordinary negligence. The Court held that the deputy’s conduct of looking away from the road was not a privileged act, and thus ordinary negligence principles applied.