15 N.Y.3d 676 (2010)
A municipality is shielded from liability for its employees’ actions involving professional judgment, provided such judgment is exercised in compliance with the municipality’s established procedures.
Summary
In 2005, New York City police officers responded to a report of an attempted armed robbery. During the pursuit and subsequent shootout with the suspect, the plaintiff, Tammy Johnson, was injured by an errant bullet. Johnson sued the City, alleging negligence and violation of police department guidelines on the use of deadly force. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that the officers acted within their professional judgment and did not violate police guidelines, as they testified they did not see any bystanders in the area when discharging their weapons. This case highlights the balance between police discretion in dangerous situations and the duty to protect innocent bystanders.
Facts
On May 27, 2005, NYPD officers received a complaint about an attempted armed robbery. Officers pursued a suspect who subsequently fired at them. The officers returned fire. Plaintiff Tammy Johnson, who was nearby with her child, was struck by an errant bullet during the exchange. Johnson and her daughter were taking cover behind an SUV. The officers testified that they did not see any bystanders when they fired at the suspect.
Procedural History
Johnson sued the City and officers for negligence. The Supreme Court denied both Johnson’s cross-motion for summary judgment and the City’s motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the complaint, finding no violation of police guidelines. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.
Issue(s)
Whether the police officers violated New York City Police Department Procedure No. 203-12, specifically the guideline stating that officers shall not discharge their weapons when doing so will unnecessarily endanger innocent persons, thereby negating the municipality’s immunity from liability under the professional judgment rule.
Holding
No, because the officers exercised their professional judgment in compliance with established procedures, as they testified that they did not see any bystanders in the immediate vicinity when they discharged their weapons at a suspect who was actively firing at them.
Court’s Reasoning
The court applied the professional judgment rule, which shields a municipality from liability when its employees exercise professional judgment in performing their duties. The court noted that this immunity presupposes that judgment and discretion are exercised in compliance with the municipality’s procedures. The relevant police guideline states that officers shall not discharge their weapons when doing so will unnecessarily endanger innocent persons. The court emphasized that this guideline doesn’t prohibit firearm discharge whenever bystanders are present, but allows officers to exercise judgment. The court highlighted the uncontroverted testimony of the officers, stating they had a clear view of the suspect and did not observe any bystanders when they fired. The court distinguished this case from cases like Lubecki v. City of New York and Rodriguez v. City of New York, where officers clearly violated police procedures by firing when innocent persons were directly in the line of fire or being used as shields. The court stated, “the very basis for the value judgment supporting immunity and denying individual recovery becomes irrelevant where the municipality violates its own internal rules and policies and exercises no judgment or discretion”. The dissenting opinion argued that the officers’ failure to affirmatively look for bystanders before firing created a triable issue of fact as to whether the police violated departmental guidelines.