Flemming v. Barnwell Nursing Home, 15 N.Y.3d 375 (2010): Counsel Fees for Objectors in Class Actions

15 N.Y.3d 375 (2010)

New York law does not permit an award of counsel fees and expenses to an objector in a class action lawsuit.

Summary

This case addresses whether an objector to a class action settlement can recover attorney’s fees. A class action was brought against Barnwell Nursing Home for failing to meet patient care standards. Caroline Ahlfors Mouris objected to the proposed attorney’s fees for class counsel, compensation for the settlement administrator, and the incentive award to the class representative, but not the overall settlement amount. She also sought attorney’s fees for her work as an objector. The New York Court of Appeals held that CPLR 909 only allows attorney’s fees for the representatives of the class, not for objectors, even if their objections are successful. The court declined to apply the “common fund” doctrine to authorize such an award.

Facts

A class-action lawsuit was initiated on behalf of 242 residents of Barnwell Nursing Home, alleging failure to comply with patient care standards under Public Health Law § 2801-d. The parties reached a settlement after nearly six years of litigation. Caroline Ahlfors Mouris, representing her mother’s estate, objected to the proposed fees for class counsel, the settlement administrator’s compensation, and the incentive award for the class representative. Mouris also requested counsel fees for preparing and presenting her objections.

Procedural History

Supreme Court approved the settlement, awarding fees to class counsel, an incentive award to the originator of the claim, and compensation to the administrator. The court denied Mouris’s objections and her request for counsel fees, finding her objections did not assist the court or benefit the class. The Appellate Division modified the Supreme Court’s order by reducing or eliminating the awards, holding that CPLR 909 does not allow counsel fees to parties other than class counsel. The New York Court of Appeals granted Mouris leave to appeal.

Issue(s)

Whether New York law permits an award of counsel fees and expenses to an objector in a class action lawsuit.

Holding

No, because the language of CPLR 909 permits attorney fee awards only to “the representatives of the class,” and does not authorize an award of counsel fees to any other party, individual, or counsel.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals relied on the general rule in New York that attorneys’ fees are incidental to litigation and are not recoverable unless supported by statute, court rule, or written agreement. CPLR 909, enacted as part of a comprehensive reform of class action laws in New York, codifies the common-law rule that attorneys’ fees may be paid from a fund created for the class. The court emphasized the statute’s language, which permits attorney fee awards only to “the representatives of the class.” The court stated, “Had the Legislature intended any party to recover attorney fees it could have expressly said so, as it has in other contexts.” The court distinguished federal practice, where some courts have awarded counsel fees to objectors under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure rule 23(h), noting that New York’s statute is only partly modeled on the federal provision. While Mouris argued for application of the “common fund” doctrine, the court rejected it, stating that no modern New York court has applied the rule to authorize an objector’s counsel fee award in a class action. The dissenting opinion argued that denying fees to successful objectors discourages monitoring of attorney’s fees and is contrary to the common fund doctrine. The dissent contended CPLR 909 should not be interpreted as a comprehensive codification that eliminates the common fund doctrine in this context, and that the statute does not explicitly forbid awarding fees to non-representatives of the class. The majority countered that the Legislature had the opportunity to provide for objector fees when revising CPLR Article 9, and its silence indicates no such intent, thus the court would not “assume a provision it could have easily provided and recognize a doctrine that has not been invoked in the last century.”