Geraci v. Probst, 15 N.Y.3d 343 (2010): Limits on Liability for Republication of Defamatory Statements

Geraci v. Probst, 15 N.Y.3d 343 (2010)

A party who makes a defamatory statement is not liable for its subsequent republication by a third party unless the original speaker authorized, requested, or participated in the republication.

Summary

Geraci sued Probst for defamation after Probst falsely accused him of receiving a commission on fire truck sales to the Syosset Fire District. At trial, the court admitted a Newsday article republishing the defamatory statement, which appeared years after Probst’s original statement and without his involvement. The Court of Appeals held that the admission of the republication was error because Probst had no connection to the Newsday article. The Court clarified the standard for republication liability, emphasizing that the original defamer must have authorized, requested, or participated in the republication to be held liable for it.

Facts

Geraci and Probst were former business partners selling fire trucks. Geraci, a Syosset Fire District commissioner, stated he would not profit from sales to the district. Probst sent a letter to the Board of Fire Commissioners claiming Geraci shared a commission from a Syosset rescue vehicle sale, which was false. More than two years after the suit was filed and three years after the letter, Newsday published an article about an investigation into fire apparatus sales, mentioning the allegation of a “hidden commission for Geraci.” Probst had no involvement with the Newsday article.

Procedural History

Geraci sued Probst for defamation in Supreme Court. The trial court admitted the Newsday article over Probst’s objection. The jury found for Geraci. The Supreme Court reduced the damages award. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding the republication argument unpreserved. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the Newsday article republishing Probst’s defamatory statement.

2. Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury that Probst’s statement was defamatory per se.

Holding

1. Yes, because Probst had no connection to the Newsday article’s republication of the defamatory statement.

2. No, because Probst’s statement alleged acts constituting a misdemeanor in violation of the General Municipal Law and could damage Geraci’s professional reputation.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals found the republication argument preserved. Citing Schoepflin v. Coffey, 162 N.Y. 12 (1900), the Court reiterated the long-standing rule that a person is not responsible for the voluntary and unjustifiable repetition of a defamatory statement by others without their authority or request. The Court reasoned that each person who repeats the defamatory statement is responsible for the resulting damages. Admission of the Newsday article was erroneous because there was no evidence Probst had any connection to the article. The Court rejected Geraci’s argument that republication was reasonably expected, clarifying that the foreseeability standard in Karaduman v. Newsday, Inc., 51 N.Y.2d 531 (1980), and the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 576(c), applied only when the original speaker made the statement directly to a reporter or widely disseminated the information, neither of which occurred here. The Court distinguished Rinaldi v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 52 N.Y.2d 422 (1981) to support this holding. As for the defamatory per se instruction, the Court held that Probst’s statement alleged acts constituting a misdemeanor under General Municipal Law § 801(1) and could damage Geraci’s professional reputation, justifying the instruction. The Court noted: “[G]enerally, a written statement may be defamatory ‘if it tends to expose a person to hatred, contempt or aversion, or to induce an evil or unsavory opinion of him in the minds of a substantial number of the community’”.