People v. Frederick, 17 N.Y.3d 912 (2011)
When a superseding indictment is deemed a nullity, the original indictment can be reinstated, and a sentence for a crime in the reinstated indictment can run consecutively to sentences from a prior, separate criminal act.
Summary
Trevor Frederick attacked his former girlfriend and her date. He was initially indicted on multiple charges related to both victims, but the jury deadlocked on felony murder. The prosecution obtained a superseding indictment charging felony murder and manslaughter, but the trial court dismissed it. The court then reinstated the original indictment’s felony murder charge. Frederick was convicted of felony murder and sentenced consecutively to his prior sentences. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the reinstatement was proper since the superseding indictment was a nullity and the consecutive sentence was justified due to the separate nature of the crimes.
Facts
Trevor Frederick, enraged that his former girlfriend went on a date with the victim, forced his way into her dorm room. He stabbed the girlfriend in the neck, causing paralysis. Frederick then made a statement suggesting he was moving towards the victim who was standing near a window. The victim was later found dead in the courtyard below, having suffered blunt impact trauma and multiple stab wounds, including one to the neck.
Procedural History
Frederick was initially indicted on multiple charges related to both the girlfriend and the victim. At the first trial, the depraved indifference murder count was dismissed, and a mistrial was declared after a juror was unable to continue deliberating. A second trial resulted in convictions on all counts except felony murder, on which the jury deadlocked, leading to a mistrial on that count. The People then obtained a superseding indictment charging Frederick with felony murder and first-degree manslaughter. The trial court dismissed the superseding indictment and reinstated the original indictment. Frederick was convicted of felony murder in a bench trial. The Appellate Division affirmed. He appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
1. Whether the trial court had the authority to reinstate the original indictment’s felony murder charge after dismissing a superseding indictment.
2. Whether the trial court could impose a sentence for felony murder that ran consecutively to sentences previously imposed for crimes against the girlfriend.
Holding
1. Yes, because if the superseding indictment is a nullity, any consequences flowing from it are also a nullity. The trial court possessed inherent authority to reinstate the original indictment in the absence of any constitutional or statutory double jeopardy bar.
2. Yes, because the crimes against the girlfriend and the victim were separate and distinct acts in an extended criminal rampage.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reasoned that since Frederick himself argued that the superseding indictment was a nullity, the dismissal of the original indictment, which was a consequence of the superseding indictment, was also a nullity. The court emphasized that the Criminal Procedure Law does not expressly preclude the reinstatement of an indictment in such circumstances. The court cited Matter of Lionel E., 76 NY2d 747, 749 (1990), indicating the trial court’s inherent authority to reinstate the original indictment. The court stated that “logically, if the superseding indictment is a nullity—as defendant himself argued and Supreme Court held to be the case—then any action or consequence that flowed from its filing—here, the dismissal of the original indictment—was necessarily a nullity as well.”
Regarding the consecutive sentence, the court relied on People v. Ramirez, 89 NY2d 444, 451 (1996), which allows for consecutive sentences for separate and distinct acts. The court found that the attack on the girlfriend and the subsequent killing of the victim were separate acts, justifying the consecutive sentence. Distinguishing People v. Parks, 95 NY2d 811 (2000) and People v. Alford, 14 NY3d 846 (2010), the court emphasized that because this was a bench trial, the judge, as factfinder, knew the facts and could determine whether they supported a consecutive sentence without any uncertainty arising from a lack of specificity in a jury charge.