People v. Acevedo, 15 N.Y.3d 828 (2010)
A court resentencing a defendant under the Drug Law Reform Act (DLRA) does not have the authority to modify the original sentencing court’s determination regarding whether sentences should run concurrently or consecutively.
Summary
Acevedo was convicted of drug and weapon offenses and sentenced to consecutive terms for the drug and weapon charges. Subsequently, he sought resentencing under the Drug Law Reform Act (DLRA) of 2004. The resentencing court reduced his drug sentence but maintained the original sentencing court’s directive that the weapon possession sentences run consecutively to the drug sentences. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the DLRA allows for alteration of the existing sentence as authorized by law, but does not empower a resentencing court to alter the consecutive or concurrent nature of the original sentences. The court clarified that DLRA resentencing does not constitute imposing an “additional term of imprisonment” allowing modification of the original sentencing structure.
Facts
Acevedo was convicted in County Court on November 7, 1997, of multiple drug and weapon offenses. He received sentences that included an indeterminate prison term of 15 years to life for criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree. The sentencing court ordered the sentences for the weapon possession convictions to run consecutively to the drug convictions.
Procedural History
The Appellate Division affirmed Acevedo’s convictions and sentences. Leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals was denied. In 2005, Acevedo moved for resentencing under the Drug Law Reform Act (DLRA) of 2004, arguing for a reduced sentence on the drug felony and for concurrent sentences on the weapon charges. The County Court reduced the drug sentence but declined to change the consecutive nature of the weapon sentences. The Appellate Division affirmed the resentence. The Court of Appeals granted Acevedo leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether a trial court, when granting a defendant’s application for resentencing under the Drug Law Reform Act, has the authority to modify the conditions of a sentence by changing its terms from consecutive to concurrent.
Holding
No, because the purpose of the DLRA is to ameliorate harsh sentences, not to grant resentencing courts the power to modify the original sentencing court’s determinations regarding consecutive or concurrent sentences.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals held that reliance on Penal Law § 70.25 (1) and Matter of Murray v. Goord was misplaced. The Court reasoned that the purpose of the DLRA is to address the severity of the Rockefeller Drug Laws by allowing for a reduced sentence. However, reducing a sentence under the DLRA does not constitute imposing an “additional term of imprisonment” under Penal Law § 70.25 (1), which would trigger the court’s discretion to determine whether sentences should run concurrently or consecutively. The court distinguished the DLRA proceeding from a typical resentencing, stating that the DLRA proceeding is designed to “effect an alteration of the existing sentence as authorized by law.” The Court cited People v. Vaughan, stating that “a court that resentences a defendant pursuant to the 2004 DLRA does not possess the authority, conferred by Penal Law § 70.25 (1), to determine whether the sentence is to be served concurrently or consecutively with respect to other sentences.”