Howard S. v. Lillian S., 14 N.Y.3d 431 (2010)

In equitable distribution cases, discovery into marital fault is only permissible in egregious cases that shock the conscience of the court, and adultery alone typically does not meet this high standard.

Summary

This case clarifies the limited circumstances under which marital fault can be considered in equitable distribution in a divorce proceeding under New York law. The husband sought liberal discovery regarding the wife’s adultery, arguing it constituted egregious fault. The Court of Appeals held that adultery, even with its consequences like concealing the child’s paternity, does not constitute egregious conduct justifying extensive discovery or altering the equitable distribution of marital assets. The court emphasized that only truly exceptional, outrageous conduct should warrant consideration of fault in asset division.

Facts

The husband and wife married in 1997. The wife had one child from a prior relationship who was adopted by the husband. They had three children together. The youngest child was conceived during an extramarital affair by the wife, a fact she concealed from the husband. In 2007, the wife allegedly began another affair. The husband confronted her, but she denied it and suggested collaborative law. Later, a DNA test revealed the husband was not the youngest child’s father. The husband then commenced a divorce action based on cruel and inhuman treatment and adultery and a fraud claim, alleging he relied on the wife’s representations of fidelity to his financial detriment.

Procedural History

The husband sued for divorce and fraud; the wife counterclaimed for abandonment. The Supreme Court denied the wife’s motion to dismiss the fraud claim but limited damages to collaborative law process fees, also denying the husband’s cross-motion for liberal discovery based on egregious fault. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding no egregious fault and limiting fraud damages. One Justice dissented, advocating for liberal discovery. The Court of Appeals then affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

Issue(s)

1. Whether adultery, and its associated conduct (concealing a child’s paternity), constitutes “egregious conduct” warranting consideration of marital fault in equitable distribution under Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (5) (d)?

2. Whether the husband is entitled to liberal discovery regarding the wife’s alleged marital fault for purposes of equitable distribution?

Holding

1. No, because adultery, even with the consequence of concealing the child’s paternity, does not constitute egregious conduct in this context.

2. No, because liberal discovery on issues of marital fault is not permitted in the absence of egregious conduct.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court relied on O’Brien v. O’Brien, stating that marital fault is generally not considered in equitable distribution except in egregious cases that shock the conscience. The Court reasoned that marriage is an economic partnership, and asset division should reflect that partnership, not moral judgments. Adultery, though a ground for divorce, does not automatically constitute egregious conduct. The Court emphasized that egregious conduct must fall “well outside the bounds of the basis for an ordinary divorce action.” The court provided examples of egregious conduct such as attempted bribery of a trial judge or vicious assault of a spouse in the presence of children. The Court found that the wife’s actions, while causing distress, did not rise to the level of outrageous or conscience-shocking conduct required to warrant consideration of marital fault. Permitting broad discovery based on claims of adultery would open the door to abuse and harassment and encourage disadvantageous settlements. The Court also stated, “Absent these types of extreme circumstances, courts are not in the business of regulating how spouses treat one another.” While full disclosure is generally favored, Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(5)(d) specifically governs equitable distribution, and the Court interpreted this more specific section to limit consideration of marital fault.