Trupia v. Lake George Central School District, 14 N.Y.3d 392 (2010)
The assumption of risk doctrine, which can negate a defendant’s duty of care, is primarily limited to athletic and recreational activities where the plaintiff has freely assumed a known risk, and should not be broadly applied to ordinary negligence claims, especially those involving the supervision of children.
Summary
This case addresses the scope of the assumption of risk doctrine in New York negligence law. An infant plaintiff was injured while riding a bannister during a summer program. The defendant school district sought to amend its answer to include assumption of risk as a defense, arguing the plaintiff consented to the risks involved. The Court of Appeals held that the assumption of risk doctrine is primarily applicable to athletic and recreational activities, not to the general supervision of children. Extending the doctrine beyond these activities would undermine comparative negligence principles and an educational institution’s duty of care.
Facts
Luke Anthony Trupia, an infant plaintiff, attended a summer program administered by the Lake George Central School District. While at the program, Luke rode a bannister and fell, sustaining serious injuries. The plaintiff’s complaint alleged negligent supervision, claiming Luke was left unsupervised at the time of the accident. The defendants sought to amend their answer to assert the affirmative defense of assumption of risk, arguing that Luke had previously fallen from a bannister and thus knew the risks.
Procedural History
The Supreme Court granted the defendant’s motion to amend their answer. The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s order, denying the motion for leave to amend. The Appellate Division granted the defendant leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals and certified the question of whether the Appellate Division erred in denying the defendant’s motion to amend their answer.
Issue(s)
Whether the Appellate Division erred in denying the defendant’s motion for leave to amend their answer to include the affirmative defense of primary assumption of risk in a negligence action based on a lack of supervision of a child.
Holding
No, because the assumption of risk doctrine is generally limited to athletic and recreational activities, and applying it to the general supervision of children would undermine the principles of comparative negligence and a school’s duty of care.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals addressed the interplay between assumption of risk and comparative negligence, noting that CPLR 1411 abolished assumption of risk as an absolute defense, replacing it with a system of comparative fault. However, assumption of risk has persisted as a means of limiting a defendant’s duty, based on the idea that a plaintiff who freely assumes a known risk negates the defendant’s duty to protect them from that risk. The court emphasized that the doctrine is most persuasively justified by its utility in facilitating free and vigorous participation in athletic activities, as stated in Benitez v New York City Bd. of Educ., 73 NY2d 650, 657 (1989). The Court was concerned that extending the doctrine beyond these circumstances would undermine the legislative intent of comparative negligence under CPLR 1411 which applies to “any action to recover damages for personal injury, injury to property, or wrongful death.” The Court also reasoned that applying assumption of risk in cases involving children would severely diminish an educational institution’s duty to supervise children adequately, because “Children often act impulsively or without good judgment—that is part of being a child; they do not thereby consent to assume the consequently arising dangers, and it would not be a prudent rule of law that would broadly permit the conclusion that they had done so.” The Court explicitly stated that the inference of assumption of risk “may not be made in their case, or for that matter where adults are concerned, except in the context of pursuits both unusually risky and beneficial that the defendant has in some nonculpable way enabled.”