Mullen v. City of New York, 14 N.Y.3d 190 (2010)
The “firefighter rule” bars common-law negligence recovery by firefighters and police officers for injuries resulting from risks associated with their employment, even when not technically on duty, if the injury arises from a risk inherent in police work.
Summary
A police officer, while entering the parking lot of the New York City Police Headquarters, was injured when a security gate, designed to prevent car bombs, malfunctioned and lifted his car. The officer sued the City and Police Department for negligence. The New York Court of Appeals held that the “firefighter rule” barred the officer’s recovery because the injury resulted from a risk associated with the inherent dangers of police work, regardless of whether the officer was technically on duty at the time. The court emphasized the heightened risk faced by police officers encountering such security devices.
Facts
The plaintiff, a commanding officer, was driving into the parking lot of the New York City Police Headquarters. The parking lot was protected by a retractable concrete barrier designed to stop car bombs. Plaintiff showed his credentials, and the barrier was lowered, but then it unexpectedly rose again while his car was passing over it. The front of the car was lifted approximately four feet, and the plaintiff sustained injuries.
Procedural History
The plaintiff sued the City and the Police Department for negligence. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the defendants based on the firefighter rule. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.
Issue(s)
Whether the “firefighter rule” bars a police officer’s recovery for injuries sustained due to the negligent operation of a security device at police headquarters, when the officer was not technically on duty but entering the facility using his police credentials.
Holding
Yes, because the injury arose from a risk “associated with the particular dangers inherent” in police work, specifically the heightened risk of encountering security devices protecting police facilities from terrorist attacks.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals relied on the firefighter rule as articulated in Zanghi v Niagara Frontier Transp. Commn., which states that police officers may not recover in common-law negligence for line-of-duty injuries resulting from risks associated with the particular dangers inherent in that type of employment. The court distinguished between situations where an officer’s duties increased the risk of injury and those where the duties merely furnished the occasion for the injury. The court stated, “[W]here some act taken in furtherance of a specific police or firefighting function exposed the officer to a heightened risk of sustaining the particular injury, he or she may not recover damages for common-law negligence.”
The court found that the high-security device protecting the police headquarters parking lot was plainly a risk “associated with the particular dangers inherent” in police work. While ordinary civilians might encounter such devices, police officers are far more likely to do so, especially when working in secure areas at risk of terrorist attacks. The court emphasized that the officer’s entry into the protected parking lot, permitted only by his police credentials, exposed him to this risk.
The court dismissed the plaintiff’s argument that he was not technically “on duty” at the time of the injury, stating that the nature of the risk, rather than the officer’s duty status, is dispositive. Police officers often face significant risks even when not technically at work. The court concluded that the plaintiff’s claim was barred by the firefighter rule because the injury stemmed from a risk inherent to police work.