14 N.Y.3d 452 (2010)
Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104, which provides a reckless disregard standard of care for drivers of emergency vehicles, cannot be used offensively by the emergency vehicle operator to prevent a comparative fault defense when the operator is the plaintiff.
Summary
A Deputy Sheriff, Ayers, was injured when his patrol car was struck by O’Brien while making a U-turn to pursue a speeding vehicle. Ayers sued O’Brien for negligence. O’Brien asserted a comparative fault defense. Ayers moved to dismiss the defense, arguing that as an emergency vehicle operator, he was only liable for reckless disregard under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e), and he had not acted recklessly. The New York Court of Appeals held that the reckless disregard standard only applies when the emergency vehicle operator is a defendant, not when they are the plaintiff. The comparative fault defense was reinstated.
Facts
On July 31, 2005, Deputy Sheriff Ayers was on patrol. Ayers made a U-turn to pursue a speeding vehicle. While executing the U-turn, Ayers’ patrol car was struck by a vehicle owned and operated by O’Brien.
Procedural History
Ayers sued O’Brien for common-law negligence in New York State Supreme Court. O’Brien asserted a comparative fault defense. The Supreme Court granted Ayers’ motion to dismiss the comparative fault defense. The Appellate Division reversed, reinstating the defense. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and certified the question of whether the Appellate Division erred in reinstating the defense.
Issue(s)
Whether the reckless disregard standard of liability under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e) applies in determining the culpable conduct of the operator of an emergency vehicle when the operator is the plaintiff.
Holding
No, because Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e) is intended to protect emergency vehicle operators from liability, not to provide them with an advantage when they are the ones bringing the lawsuit.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reasoned that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e) was designed to give emergency vehicle operators the freedom to perform their duties without being unduly hampered by the normal rules of the road. Citing Saarinen v. Kerr, 84 N.Y.2d 494 (1994), the court reiterated that the purpose of the statute is to prevent emergency personnel from being deterred from taking calculated risks to save lives or property due to the fear of civil liability for “a mere failure of judgment.” The court emphasized that the statute “precludes the imposition of liability for otherwise privileged conduct except where the conduct rises to the level of recklessness.”
However, the court found that allowing Ayers to use the statute to shield himself from a comparative fault defense would be an inappropriate extension of the statute’s purpose. The court stated that Ayers’ interpretation of the statute would “shift the responsibility for any contributory negligence on the part of an emergency vehicle operator to the driver of another vehicle whom the emergency vehicle operator sues.” This would lead to unfair results, such as an emergency vehicle operator recovering full damages from a minimally negligent defendant even if the operator’s own negligence contributed to the injuries. The court concluded that there was no evidence that the legislature intended such a “financial windfall” when it enacted the statute. The Court stated that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 (e) “cannot be used as a sword to ward off a comparative fault defense” and should only apply when the emergency vehicle operator is sued or countersued.