Hargett v. Town of Ticonderoga, 13 N.Y.3d 326 (2009)
Eminent Domain Procedure Law (EDPL) § 702(B) allows a condemnee to be reimbursed for attorney’s fees and costs when they successfully challenge a condemnor’s authority to acquire property in proceedings under EDPL 207(A).
Summary
This case addresses whether EDPL § 702(B) provides for the reimbursement of attorney’s fees and costs when a property owner successfully challenges a condemnor’s authority to acquire their property in an EDPL 207(A) proceeding. The Court of Appeals held that it does. In a prior action, a property owner successfully challenged the Town of Ticonderoga’s attempt to condemn her property. She then sought reimbursement for her legal fees under EDPL 702(B). The Supreme Court initially dismissed her claim, relying on a Second Department case. The Appellate Division reversed, disagreeing with the Second Department, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division, holding that EDPL 702(B) allows for reimbursement in such cases, clarifying that condemnees can seek reimbursement for fees incurred during the initial challenge to the condemnation.
Facts
The Superintendent of Highways of the Town of Ticonderoga sought to condemn certain real property for purposes not related to his position.
The property owner challenged the condemnation, arguing that the Superintendent exceeded his authority.
The Appellate Division agreed with the property owner, determining that the Superintendent’s actions were unauthorized.
The property owner then commenced a new action in Supreme Court, Essex County, seeking reimbursement of attorney’s fees and costs under EDPL 702(B) for the prior proceeding.
Procedural History
The Supreme Court initially dismissed the property owner’s complaint, relying on a Second Department case that interpreted EDPL 702(B) as not providing for reimbursement in such circumstances.
The Appellate Division modified the Supreme Court’s order, granting the property owner’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability and remitting the case to Supreme Court to determine the amount of reimbursable costs. The Appellate Division expressly disagreed with the Second Department case.
The Appellate Division then granted the Town’s motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals, certifying a question regarding the correctness of the Appellate Division’s decision.
Issue(s)
Whether EDPL § 702(B) provides for reimbursement of attorney’s fees and costs when a condemnee successfully challenges a condemnor’s authority to acquire real property in proceedings pursuant to EDPL 207(A).
Holding
Yes, because EDPL 702(B) provides for reimbursement to a condemnee who successfully challenges a “proposed acquisition” at the first step of the eminent domain process (EDPL 207) and obtains a judicial determination that the condemnor lacks the authority to pursue the proposed acquisition.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reasoned that although the EDPL defines “acquisition” as the vesting of title, the definition of “condemnee” includes those subject to a “proposed acquisition.”
Since EDPL 207(A) requires a condemnee to challenge the condemnor’s authority within 30 days of the determination, they cannot wait until the vesting proceeding (step two). Thus, EDPL 702(B) must provide reimbursement for those who successfully challenge the proposed acquisition at the first step.
The court stated, “Given section 207 (A)’s 30-day statute of limitations to seek such judicial review, a condemnee may not sit on its claims until the second step when the condemnor commences a vesting proceeding…Rather, a condemnee must seek judicial review in the Appellate Division practically forthwith—before step two of the process.”
The Court found no reason why the legislature would allow reimbursement to condemnees successful in Article 4 proceedings, but not to those successful in Article 2 proceedings.
The Court clarified that the fees and costs that may be reimbursed are limited to those “actually incurred by such condemnee because of the acquisition procedure” (EDPL 702[B]). The Court did not decide whether fees incurred *before* an adverse determination are reimbursable.