Bazakos v. Lewis, 12 N.Y.3d 631 (2009)
A claim against a doctor for negligence during an Independent Medical Examination (IME) is a claim for medical malpractice, subject to CPLR 214-a’s two-year-and-six-month statute of limitations, even in the absence of a traditional doctor-patient relationship.
Summary
Lewis Bazakos sued Dr. Philip Lewis, alleging injury during an IME required for a previous lawsuit. Bazakos claimed Lewis negligently injured him by forcefully rotating his head. The suit was filed approximately 2 years and 11 months after the IME. The court addressed whether such a claim constitutes medical malpractice subject to a shorter statute of limitations, or ordinary negligence. The Court of Appeals held that the claim was for medical malpractice because the doctor’s actions involved medical skill, and the legislative intent behind the shorter statute of limitations for malpractice applied equally to IMEs. Therefore, the claim was time-barred.
Facts
Lewis Bazakos was involved in a prior lawsuit stemming from an automobile accident. As part of that lawsuit, Bazakos was required to undergo an Independent Medical Examination (IME) by a physician selected by the opposing party.
The opposing party designated Dr. Philip Lewis to conduct the IME. Dr. Lewis examined Bazakos on November 27, 2001.
Bazakos alleged that during the IME, Dr. Lewis injured him by “tak[ing] plaintiff’s head in his hands and forcefully rotated it while simultaneously pulling.”
Procedural History
Bazakos commenced an action against Lewis on October 15, 2004, approximately 2 years and 11 months after the IME.
Lewis moved to dismiss, arguing the claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Supreme Court granted the motion, relying on Evangelista v. Zolan.
The Appellate Division reversed, overruling Evangelista, holding the action was timely because no physician-patient relationship existed, thus the claim was not for medical malpractice. Two justices dissented.
The Appellate Division granted Lewis leave to appeal, certifying the question of whether its order was properly made.
Issue(s)
Whether a claim against a doctor for alleged negligence during an Independent Medical Examination (IME) constitutes a claim for “medical malpractice” under CPLR 214-a, thus subject to the statute’s two-year-and-six-month statute of limitations.
Holding
No, because such actions involve medical treatment by a licensed physician, regardless of the absence of a traditional physician-patient relationship.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court reasoned that the essence of Bazakos’s claim, like any medical malpractice claim, is that a doctor failed to competently perform a procedure requiring specialized medical skill.
The Court emphasized that the act underlying the lawsuit – Lewis’s manipulation of Bazakos’s body – constitutes “medical treatment by a licensed physician,” thus negligent performance constitutes medical malpractice, citing Weiner v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 88 N.Y.2d 784, 788 (1996).
The Court noted the legislative intent behind CPLR 214-a, enacted to address a crisis in medical malpractice insurance, aimed to enable “health care providers to get malpractice insurance at reasonable rates” (quoting Bleiler, 65 NY2d at 68). The Court found it unlikely the Legislature intended to exclude doctors performing IMEs from this protection.
The Court agreed with the dissenting Justices at the Appellate Division that a “limited physician-patient relationship” exists during an IME, referencing an AMA opinion on the ethical responsibilities of doctors performing IMEs.
Quoting Dyer v. Trachtman, 470 Mich. 45, 49-50, 679 N.W.2d 311, 314-315 (2004), the Court stated that this limited relationship “imposes a duty on the IME physician to perform the examination in a manner not to cause physical harm to the examinee.”
The dissenting opinion argued that medical malpractice requires medical treatment, which was absent in the IME context. The dissent emphasized that the purpose of CPLR 214-a was to protect health care providers offering treatment, not those providing litigation support services. The dissent asserted that context matters, and that what constitutes malpractice in a treatment setting may not in an IME setting, highlighting the limited scope of responsibility in an IME.