13 N.Y.3d 583 (2009)
The state constitutional rule excluding unnecessarily suggestive police-arranged identifications does not extend to identifications where the suggestion originates from private citizens.
Summary
The New York Court of Appeals held that the rule excluding suggestive police-arranged identifications does not apply when the suggestiveness originates from a private citizen. The victim, Peter L., was robbed and shot. Months later, his sister, Margaret, who knew the defendant, told Peter she thought the defendant was the shooter and showed him the defendant’s picture. Peter then identified the defendant in a police lineup. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the exclusionary rule is primarily aimed at deterring police misconduct and does not extend to private communications.
Facts
Peter L. was robbed and shot. He was shown hundreds of photographs by police but made no identification. Six months later, Peter’s sister, Margaret, met the defendant, who told her, “I actually shot someone on this block.” Margaret later told Peter she thought she knew who shot him and showed him the defendant’s picture. Peter initially rejected the idea but then identified the defendant from the picture. Margaret reinforced this with a letter describing the defendant as “[t]he kid that everyone thinks shot you.”
Procedural History
The victim and his sister then went to the police, who arranged a lineup where Peter identified the defendant. The defendant’s motion to suppress the identification was denied, and he was convicted of robbery and assault. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether the state constitutional rule excluding unnecessarily suggestive police-arranged identifications extends to identifications where the suggestiveness originates from a private citizen.
Holding
No, because the primary goal of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct, and this goal cannot be advanced by extending the rule to cases where the suggestion comes from private citizens.
Court’s Reasoning
The court reasoned that the exclusionary rule for suggestive identifications, as established in People v. Adams, is designed to enhance the truth-finding process and prevent wrongful convictions by influencing police procedures. The court stated: “The exclusionary rules were fashioned to deter improper conduct on the part of law enforcement officials which might lead to mistaken identifications”. Extending this rule to private communications would not deter such communications, as family and friends are unlikely to regulate their conduct based on court rules of evidence suppression.
The court distinguished this case from federal cases and cases in other states, noting that those cases either involved police or prosecutor actions or dealt with non-constitutional evidentiary issues. The court emphasized that its decision was based on a constitutional issue and declined to extend a per se constitutional rule of exclusion to cases where a private citizen’s communication results in an identification.
The court acknowledged the risk of misidentification due to suggestiveness, regardless of its source. However, it emphasized that suggestiveness is just one potential source of error. The court noted that the proper remedy when law enforcement is not the source of the suggestive identification is to rely on cross-examination, counsel’s arguments, and other evidence to allow juries to assess the reliability of eyewitnesses.
Ultimately, the Court refused to extend the Adams rule because its primary purpose is to influence police conduct, and such influence is impossible when private citizens are the source of the suggestion. The Court suggested expert testimony on eyewitness fallibility may be admissible in certain cases and did not foreclose the possibility that a court could exclude testimony that is more prejudicial than probative under common-law rules of evidence.