13 N.Y.3d 67 (2009)

To convict a defendant of criminal possession of a forged instrument, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant not only knew the instrument was forged but also possessed it with the specific intent to defraud, deceive, or injure another.

Summary

Eric Bailey was convicted of attempted grand larceny and possession of a forged instrument after police observed him engaging in suspicious behavior in Manhattan restaurants and found counterfeit bills in his pocket. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the forged instrument conviction, holding that the evidence was insufficient to prove Bailey possessed the counterfeit bills with the intent to defraud, deceive, or injure another. The court reasoned that his knowledge that the bills were counterfeit, coupled with his attempted larcenies, did not establish the specific intent required for the forgery charge.

Facts

Police observed Eric Bailey entering and leaving several fast-food restaurants without making purchases. In one restaurant, he attempted to steal a woman’s purse. In another, he was seen reaching for a woman’s handbag, and her coat pocket was turned inside out. Upon arrest, a search revealed three counterfeit $10 bills in Bailey’s pocket. When an officer remarked that the bills were counterfeit, Bailey responded, “[y]ou got me for the counterfeit money, but I didn’t have my hand near the purse.”

Procedural History

Bailey was convicted in a jury trial of attempted grand larceny and possession of a forged instrument. He moved to set aside the forgery conviction, arguing insufficient evidence of his intent to defraud. The trial court denied the motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

Issue(s)

Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to prove that Bailey possessed the counterfeit bills with the specific intent to defraud, deceive, or injure another, as required for a conviction of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the first degree under Penal Law § 170.30.

Holding

No, because the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Bailey possessed the counterfeit bills with the specific intent to defraud, deceive, or injure another; his knowledge of the bills’ counterfeit nature and his contemporaneous attempts at larceny were insufficient to establish the requisite intent for the forgery charge.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals found that while Bailey’s statement proved his knowledge that the bills were counterfeit, knowledge alone was insufficient for a conviction. The court emphasized that knowledge and intent are separate elements, each requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The court rejected the argument that intent could be inferred from Bailey’s presence in a shopping district, his possession of counterfeit bills, and his larcenous intent, noting that the intent to commit a crime must be specific to the crime charged. The court distinguished the case from others where intent was more directly linked to the crime, such as possessing multiple forged documents with the intent to sell them. The court noted, “[w]hy would Bailey, already embarked upon a brazen effort to commit theft, carry currency in his pocket that he knew to be bogus unless his plan was to pass it off to an unsuspecting storekeeper, newsvendor, or fast food worker?” The court rejected this notion stating, “[t]here is no dispute that defendant’s inculpatory statement proved that he knew the bills were counterfeit. However, knowledge alone is not sufficient to hold defendant criminally liable for possessing a forged instrument…Simply put, drawing the inference of defendant’s intent from his knowledge that the bills were counterfeit improperly shifts the burden of proof with respect to intent from the People to the defendant.” The court also noted that the legislature did not create a statutory presumption of intent regarding counterfeit bills, unlike statutes related to forged credit cards or welfare fraud. Judge Pigott dissented in part, arguing that the jury could reasonably infer that Bailey intended to pass the bills when the opportunity arose, given his guilty mind and possession of the bills in a shopping district.