Kopsachilis v. 130 E. 18 Owners Corp., 10 N.Y.3d 514 (2008): Landlord Liability for Extinguished Lights in Windowless Stairwells

Kopsachilis v. 130 E. 18 Owners Corp., 10 N.Y.3d 514 (2008)

A landlord can assert a “knowledge or consent” defense under Multiple Dwelling Law § 37(2) to avoid liability for extinguished lights in a windowless stairwell, even though § 37(3) requires such lights to be kept burning continuously.

Summary

Plaintiff was injured when she fell in a dark, windowless stairwell of defendant’s apartment building during the 2003 blackout. She sued, claiming the defendant violated Multiple Dwelling Law § 37(3), which requires lights in windowless fire-stairs to be kept burning continuously, constituting negligence per se. The defendant argued that § 37(2) provides a defense if a light is extinguished without the owner’s knowledge or consent. The Court of Appeals held that the “knowledge or consent” defense applies to violations of § 37(3), reversing the Appellate Division and granting summary judgment to the defendant. The court reasoned that the statute’s language and legislative intent support applying the defense, even when lights are required to be on continuously.

Facts

During the August 14, 2003 blackout, the plaintiff stayed overnight in a coworker’s apartment in a building owned by the defendant. The building’s backup battery-operated lights lasted only 40 minutes and were out when the plaintiff arrived. Building staff provided flashlights and candles, escorting occupants up the fire-stairs. The next morning, without a flashlight or assistance, the plaintiff opened the door to the fire-stairs, saw nothing, and fell, sustaining injuries. The building was not required to have emergency lighting connected to a backup power source.

Procedural History

The Supreme Court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that § 37(3) imposes a categorical duty regardless of the owner’s knowledge or consent. Two justices dissented, arguing that the statute does not impose absolute liability and the defendant should be able to assert a “knowledge or consent” defense. The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

Whether the “knowledge or consent” defense in Multiple Dwelling Law § 37(2) applies to a violation of § 37(3), which requires lights in windowless fire-stairs to be kept burning continuously.

Holding

No, because the “knowledge or consent” defense in Multiple Dwelling Law § 37(2) applies to the extinguishment of any lights required by subdivision (1), whether they are required to be on only at night or continuously.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that the statute’s language supports the application of the “knowledge or consent” defense to § 37(3). The court stated, “The words ‘[e]xcept as provided in subdivision three’ do not modify the knowledge or consent defense—the exception and the defense appear in separate sentences.” The court further reasoned that it is unlikely the Legislature intended to impose strict liability for a light failure in a windowless area but not in a windowed hallway, absent a clear statement to that effect. The court noted that the defendant did not “consent” to the blackout. Therefore, the defendant had no liability under Multiple Dwelling Law § 37. The Court emphasized the interconnectedness of subdivisions (1), (2), and (3) of the statute. Subdivision (1) establishes the lighting requirement, subdivision (2) sets the duration, and subdivision (3) creates an exception to the durational requirement. The court stated, “We therefore read subdivision (3)’s statement that lights in windowless areas ‘shall be kept burning continuously’ as stating an exception to the rule that lights need be on only at night, not as creating a new liability to which there is no defense.”