People v. Naradzay, 11 N.Y.3d 460 (2008)

To be guilty of an attempted crime, a defendant’s conduct must pass beyond mere intent or preparation and come ‘dangerously near’ the commission of the completed crime, though the defendant need not take the final step necessary.

Summary

Jason Naradzay was convicted of attempted murder and burglary after being found near D.G.’s home with a loaded shotgun and a plan to harm her and her family. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that Naradzay’s actions, including purchasing the gun, driving to the victim’s neighborhood, and possessing the loaded weapon near her property, constituted conduct that came “dangerously near” the commission of the intended crimes, even though he was apprehended before entering the home. The court emphasized that the jury was entitled to infer intent from Naradzay’s conduct and surrounding circumstances, rejecting his claim that he had abandoned his plan.

Facts

D.G. met Jason Naradzay through a mutual friend. After D.G. attempted to end their contact, Naradzay’s behavior became troubling. He appeared at events she attended, and on February 3, 2004, she told him not to contact her again. On February 4, Naradzay created a “to-do” list outlining a plan to break into D.G.’s home and shoot her and her husband. He purchased a shotgun and ammunition, telling the seller he needed a gun with less “kick” for his elderly father. He borrowed a friend’s car under false pretenses, drove to D.G.’s neighborhood, and loaded the shotgun. A motorist saw him concealing the shotgun near D.G.’s property and called 911.

Procedural History

Naradzay was indicted for attempted murder, attempted burglary, and criminal possession of a weapon. The Supreme Court denied his motion to suppress evidence. A jury convicted him on all charges. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. A dissenting Justice granted Naradzay leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

Whether Naradzay’s actions constituted conduct that came “dangerously near” the commission of burglary and murder, thereby establishing the elements of attempt under New York law.

Holding

Yes, because Naradzay’s actions went beyond mere preparation and placed him in a position to commit the intended crimes but for the intervention of law enforcement.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals applied Penal Law § 110.00, which defines an attempt as engaging in conduct that “tends to effect the commission” of a crime with the intent to commit that crime. The court emphasized that the defendant’s conduct must go beyond “mere intent or mere preparation” and come “dangerously near” the completed crime. The court found that Naradzay’s actions—creating a detailed plan, purchasing a shotgun and ammunition, driving to D.G.’s neighborhood, loading the gun, and approaching her property with the weapon—demonstrated a clear intent and constituted conduct that was “potentially and immediately dangerous.” The court rejected Naradzay’s argument that his intent wavered, stating that the jury was entitled to discredit his self-serving testimony about considering suicide. The court noted that the intervention of an observant motorist and the prompt response of law enforcement prevented Naradzay from carrying out his plan. The court cited People v. Mahboubian, stating, “there comes a point where it is ‘too late in the stage of preparation for the law to conclude that no attempt occurred.’” The court also held that the police questioning was threshold questioning and did not violate Naradzay’s Miranda rights.