Graev v. Graev, 11 N.Y.3d 262 (2008)
The term “cohabitation” in a separation agreement is ambiguous absent a clear definition within the agreement itself, and courts must consider extrinsic evidence to determine the parties’ intended meaning, rather than relying solely on a presumption of shared economic circumstances.
Summary
Linda and Lawrence Graev divorced, incorporating a settlement agreement that obligated Mr. Graev to pay spousal support, terminating if Mrs. Graev cohabitated with an unrelated adult for 60 days. Mr. Graev stopped payments, alleging cohabitation between Mrs. Graev and MP, based on overnight stays at her vacation home and their social activities as a couple. Mrs. Graev argued that “cohabitation” required sexual relations, and later, an economic unit, which did not exist. The Court of Appeals held that “cohabitation” is ambiguous without a specific definition in the agreement and reversed the lower court’s decision, remanding the case for consideration of extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent.
Facts
Linda and Lawrence Graev divorced in 1997, with a settlement agreement incorporated but not merged into the divorce judgment. The agreement stipulated Mr. Graev would pay $10,000 monthly spousal support until August 2009 or the occurrence of certain termination events, including Mrs. Graev’s cohabitation with an unrelated adult for 60 substantially consecutive days. The agreement did not define “cohabitation.” In 2004, Mr. Graev ceased payments, asserting that Mrs. Graev was cohabitating with MP, based on surveillance showing MP stayed overnight at Mrs. Graev’s vacation home in Connecticut for more than 60 days. Mr. Graev argued the pair had an “obvious serious relationship,” acting as a couple at family events.
Procedural History
Mrs. Graev moved to enforce the maintenance provisions of the settlement agreement. Mr. Graev cross-moved for summary judgment, arguing cohabitation had occurred. Supreme Court ordered a hearing to determine if the relationship constituted cohabitation, holding sexual intercourse was not conclusive. After a hearing, the trial court found no cohabitation, emphasizing the lack of a shared residence and economic unit. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding “cohabitation has a plain meaning which contemplates changed economic circumstances, and is not ambiguous.” The Court of Appeals reversed, holding the term “cohabitation” ambiguous and remanded the case for a hearing considering extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent.
Issue(s)
Whether the term “cohabitation,” as used in the settlement agreement, is ambiguous, thus requiring the consideration of extrinsic evidence to determine the parties’ intent, or whether it has a plain meaning under New York law that requires a shared economic unit.
Holding
No, the term “cohabitation” is ambiguous as used in the settlement agreement because neither the dictionary nor New York case law supplies an authoritative or “plain” meaning. Extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent must be considered.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals found that the word “cohabitation” is ambiguous because neither dictionary definitions nor New York case law provides a singular, authoritative meaning. The Court highlighted the various definitions of “cohabit,” noting the common element of “living together” in a manner resembling marriage. The Court rejected the Appellate Division’s assertion that New York case law established a distinct meaning of “cohabitation” as requiring “changed economic circumstances,” stemming from the decision in Scharnweber v. Scharnweber. While some Appellate Division decisions implied that there could be no “cohabitation” without changed economic circumstances, the Court of Appeals had never adopted that position. The Court observed the parties’ shifting interpretations of “cohabitation” throughout the litigation, further demonstrating the term’s ambiguity. Because the term is ambiguous, the Court reasoned that extrinsic evidence is necessary to determine the parties’ intent, stating, “Without extrinsic evidence as to the parties’ intent, there is no way to assess the particular factors inherent in the dictionary meanings or case law discussions of ‘cohabitation’ the parties may have meant to embrace or emphasize.” Therefore, the Court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case to Supreme Court for further proceedings to consider such evidence.