Haberman v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 8 N.Y.3d 269 (2007)
When a zoning board of appeals has voted to grant a variance, the board’s attorney, acting with actual or apparent authority, may agree to extend the time to build the improvements permitted by the variance without requiring a second board meeting and vote.
Summary
Sinclair Haberman obtained a variance from the Long Beach Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) to construct a residential complex. A subsequent dispute was resolved by a stipulation that required Haberman to obtain new variances with time limits for applying for building permits. Haberman paid the city $200,000 for public improvements, which the city failed to complete on time. Haberman agreed to extend the city’s deadline in exchange for tolling the time limits on his building permits. Years later, the ZBA revoked Haberman’s building permit, arguing the extension required a new ZBA vote. The Court of Appeals held that the ZBA’s attorney’s agreement to extend the time was binding, as the attorney had at least apparent authority and a new ZBA vote was not required.
Facts
Sinclair Haberman sought a variance to build a four-tower residential condominium complex. The ZBA granted the variance, but a dispute arose after one tower was built. A 1989 stipulation settled Haberman’s lawsuit against the City and ZBA, requiring him to apply for new variances subject to time limits for building permit applications. Haberman also agreed to pay $200,000 to the City for public improvements, including underground utility lines, to be completed by the City within two years. The City failed to meet the deadline, and Haberman agreed to extend the deadline, contingent upon tolling the time limits on his building permits.
Procedural History
Haberman applied for and received new variances in 1989. The City failed to meet the deadline for the utility lines. In 1992, Haberman agreed to extend the City’s deadline in exchange for tolling his time to apply for building permits, memorialized in a letter agreement signed by the City’s Corporation Counsel, representing the ZBA. In 2002, Haberman applied for a building permit, which the Building Department issued in 2003. The ZBA then revoked the permit, arguing Haberman missed the 1989 stipulation deadline and the extension was invalid. Haberman sued to annul the revocation. The Supreme Court annulled the ZBA’s action, but the Appellate Division reversed, finding the extension unenforceable. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether the ZBA is bound by its attorney’s agreement to extend the time to apply for building permits, or whether such an extension requires a new vote by the ZBA.
Holding
No, the ZBA is bound by its attorney’s agreement, because the attorney had at least apparent authority to act on the ZBA’s behalf and a new ZBA vote was not required for the extension.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that the Corporation Counsel’s agreement to extend Haberman’s time to apply for building permits was binding on the ZBA. The Court reasoned that parties are generally bound by their attorneys’ agreements. While granting a variance requires ZBA action, extending the duration of a variance does not require the same formality. Citing Matter of New York Life Ins. Co. v Galvin, 35 NY2d 52, 59 (1974), the Court noted that an extension does not require a new application, public notice, or a hearing. The court found no basis to require a ZBA vote for an extension. The agreement was in writing, negotiated by counsel, and approved by the court. The City received a benefit (extension of time for utility work) in exchange for the extension granted to Haberman. The Corporation Counsel, as the ZBA’s attorney, had at least apparent authority. The Court emphasized the unfairness of invalidating the agreement years later due to a procedural requirement not mandated by statute or precedent. The court stated, “It would be unfair to hold, many years after the event, that the lawyer’s agreement was a nullity because the parties did not follow a procedure that no statute and no precedent required.”