10 N.Y.3d 648 (2008)
When the state seeks to civilly commit sex offenders upon completion of their prison sentences, it must adhere to the procedural protections outlined in Mental Hygiene Law article 10, including a jury trial to determine mental abnormality and a court decision on the need for civil confinement.
Summary
This case addresses the civil commitment of convicted sex offenders upon completion of their prison sentences. The New York Court of Appeals held that the state improperly used Mental Hygiene Law article 9 to transfer offenders directly from prison to psychiatric hospitals. The Court determined that the newly enacted Mental Hygiene Law article 10, the “Sex Offender Management and Treatment Act,” governs such commitments and provides necessary procedural protections, including a jury trial to determine mental abnormality and a court decision regarding the need for civil confinement. The case was remitted for proceedings consistent with article 10.
Facts
Ten sex offenders nearing completion of their prison sentences were evaluated by the Office of Mental Health (OMH) and transferred to Kirby Forensic Psychiatric Center, a secure OMH facility, upon the expiration of their sentences in November and December 2005. The transfers were based on applications signed by prison superintendents and certifications from OMH physicians stating that each offender suffered from a mental illness requiring inpatient treatment, pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law article 9.
Procedural History
Stephen J. Harkavy, on behalf of the ten offenders, commenced a habeas corpus proceeding, arguing that the civil commitment under Mental Hygiene Law article 9 was improper and that Correction Law § 402 should have been followed. Supreme Court conditionally granted the petition, ordering hearings. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the petition and upholding the commitment under article 9. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and remitted the case, holding that Mental Hygiene Law article 10 now governs these proceedings.
Issue(s)
1. Whether the civil commitment of sex offenders upon completion of their prison sentences was properly initiated under Mental Hygiene Law article 9.
2. Whether the placement of these offenders in a secure psychiatric facility (Kirby) was appropriate in the absence of specific statutory authorization or procedural safeguards.
Holding
1. No, because the proper procedure for civil commitment of sex offenders upon release from prison is now governed by Mental Hygiene Law article 10, which was enacted to address this specific situation.
2. The issue is now academic, because under Mental Hygiene Law article 10, only offenders categorized as “dangerous sex offenders requiring confinement” are to be placed in secure facilities; all others are released for outpatient treatment and supervision.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court found that the initial commitment under Mental Hygiene Law article 9 was improper, citing its prior decision in State of N.Y. ex rel. Harkavy v Consilvio, 7 NY3d 607 (2006), which held that Correction Law § 402 was the appropriate method for evaluating inmates for post-release involuntary commitment. However, because the Legislature subsequently enacted Mental Hygiene Law article 10, the “Sex Offender Management and Treatment Act,” to specifically address this issue, the Court determined that article 10 now governs these proceedings. Article 10 provides specific procedures for the civil commitment of sex offenders nearing the end of their prison terms, including a multi-step process that may lead to civil commitment or outpatient supervision and treatment.
The Court emphasized that article 10 defines “detained sex offender” to include individuals like the petitioners, who were transferred directly from correctional facilities to psychiatric hospitals after September 1, 2005, under article 9 or Correction Law § 402. Therefore, the petitioners fall under the new statutory scheme and are entitled to its protections.
Regarding the placement in a secure facility, the Court noted that under article 10, only “dangerous sex offenders requiring confinement” must be placed in secure facilities. The Court stated, “’Dangerous sex offender requiring confinement’ means a person who is a detained sex offender suffering from a mental abnormality involving such a strong predisposition to commit sex offenses, and such an inability to control behavior, that the person is likely to be a danger to others and to commit sex offenses if not confined to a secure treatment facility” (Mental Hygiene Law § 10.03 [e]). Since nonsecure treatment is no longer authorized, the challenge to placement in a secure facility is rendered academic. The Court declined to address the separation of powers and State Administrative Procedure Act arguments, as the legislature has now articulated a state policy regarding civil commitment of sex offenders.