Bradley v. Earl B. Feiden, Inc., 8 N.Y.3d 264 (2007)
A product can breach the implied warranty of merchantability if it’s unfit for its intended purpose, even if a specific component is not proven defective, especially when the jury instructions tie a products liability claim to a specific component but not the breach of warranty claim.
Summary
Joseph Bradley sued General Electric (GE) and Earl B. Feiden, Inc. after a fire in his kitchen was allegedly caused by a GE refrigerator. Bradley asserted negligence, strict products liability, and breach of warranty. GE then filed a third-party action against NASCorp and Mid-South. The jury found GE not liable on the products liability claim (finding no defect in the defrost timer), but liable for breach of warranty (finding the refrigerator unfit for its intended purpose). The New York Court of Appeals held that sufficient evidence supported the breach of warranty claim, despite the lack of a specific defect identified in the defrost timer, given the evidence indicating the fire originated in the refrigerator itself. The court also addressed contractual indemnification, finding that Mid-South was required to indemnify GE for defense costs.
Facts
Joseph Bradley purchased a new GE Hotpoint refrigerator. Three weeks later, a fire broke out in Bradley’s kitchen, with the fire department initially reporting the refrigerator as the fire’s origin. Bradley sued GE and Feiden, alleging the fire was caused by a defect in the refrigerator’s defrost timer. At trial, Bradley presented expert testimony indicating the fire originated within the refrigerator’s freezer compartment. GE countered with evidence suggesting the fire originated in a can opener. The jury was presented with a special verdict sheet asking about the origin of the fire, a defect in the defrost timer, and breach of warranty.
Procedural History
Bradley sued GE and Feiden in New York Supreme Court. GE brought a third-party action against NASCorp and Mid-South. The jury found for GE on the products liability claim but for Bradley on the breach of warranty claim. GE moved for a directed verdict and to set aside the verdict, which was denied by the Supreme Court. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order regarding the breach of warranty claim and reinstated the jury verdict. Mid-South appealed by permission of the Appellate Division under CPLR 5602 (b), a question having been certified to us by that Court.
Issue(s)
1. Whether legally sufficient evidence existed to support the jury’s verdict in favor of the plaintiff on a breach of warranty claim against the manufacturer and retailer of a refrigerator unit when the jury also found for the manufacturer on a related products liability claim.
2. Whether the supplier of the bracket control assembly component of the refrigerator is contractually required to indemnify the manufacturer for defense costs, even where the jury found no defect in the supplier’s component.
Holding
1. Yes, because the jury could have rationally concluded the refrigerator was not fit for its intended purpose (to safely refrigerate food) regardless of whether the defrost timer was defective, especially since the jury instructions tied the products liability claim specifically to the defrost timer.
2. Yes, because the contractual indemnification clause was triggered by any “claims based on strict or product liability relating to Product,” and did not require a successful claim to mandate indemnification for defense costs.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reasoned that a breach of warranty claim only requires proof that the product was not “fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used” (UCC 2-314 [2] [c]). This can be established through circumstantial evidence. The jury instructions specifically tied the products liability claim to a defect in the defrost timer. The jury was free to find that the refrigerator itself was the source of the fire and thus unfit for its purpose, even without finding a specific defect in the defrost timer. As the court stated, the jury could rationally conclude that “such an appliance was not fit for its intended purpose, regardless of whether the defrost timer was defective, and thus that GE breached the implied warranty of merchantability.” Regarding indemnification, the court found the contract language sufficiently clear and unambiguous in requiring Mid-South to indemnify GE for claims related to its product, regardless of actual fault. The Court quoted Levine v Shell Oil Co., stating that if the indemnitor “had reservations as to the scope of the agreement, he should have insisted on a different indemnification clause or refused to give his assent to the contract.” Therefore, Mid-South was responsible for GE’s defense costs until the jury verdict.