People v. Fellows, 11 N.Y.3d 273 (2008)

For the purposes of determining prior conviction time limitations for second felony offender sentencing, incarceration includes periods where an individual is subject to the extended bounds of confinement, even if not within the physical walls of a prison.

Summary

The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a defendant participating in a day reporting program, requiring daily reporting and drug testing but allowing residence outside prison walls, was considered “incarcerated” under Penal Law § 70.06(1)(b)(v). This law excludes periods of incarceration from the ten-year look-back period for prior felony convictions when determining second felony offender status. The Court of Appeals held that the defendant was indeed “incarcerated” during this period, focusing on the restrictions imposed by the day reporting program as an extension of his original confinement. This decision clarifies the scope of “incarceration” beyond traditional imprisonment for sentencing purposes.

Facts

The defendant, Fellows, was previously convicted of a felony. Subsequently, he was convicted of another felony. In determining whether Fellows qualified as a second felony offender, the prosecution needed to establish that the second felony was committed within ten years of the first felony conviction, excluding any periods of incarceration. The critical point of contention was whether the time Fellows spent in a day reporting program should be considered “incarceration.” During this program, Fellows resided outside the physical confines of a prison, but was required to report daily, submit to drug tests, and adhere to other restrictive conditions.

Procedural History

The trial court determined that the time Fellows spent in the day reporting program did not constitute “incarceration,” a decision that impacted his sentencing. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the case to resolve the question of whether the day reporting program constituted a period of incarceration for the purpose of second felony offender sentencing.

Issue(s)

Whether, for the purpose of Penal Law § 70.06(1)(b)(v), the period a defendant spends in a day reporting program, where he resides outside of prison walls but is subject to daily reporting, drug testing, and other restrictions, constitutes a period of “incarceration” that should be excluded from the ten-year look-back period for prior felony convictions when determining second felony offender status.

Holding

Yes, because the restrictions placed on the defendant during the day reporting program extended the bounds of his confinement to the extent that he was still considered “incarcerated” under Penal Law § 70.06(1)(b)(v).

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that the term “incarcerated” should not be limited to its strictest sense of being physically confined within prison walls. The court emphasized the restrictive nature of the day reporting program, noting that the defendant’s liberty was significantly curtailed by the program’s requirements. The court highlighted the following factors:

• The defendant was required to report to a specific location daily.
• He was subject to frequent drug tests.
• His non-incarcerated status was subject to revocation at any time.

The court drew an analogy to the “extended bounds of confinement” concept used in Correction Law § 851(10). It found that while the defendant was not within the physical walls of a prison, the restrictions placed upon him by the day reporting program constituted a sufficient deprivation of liberty to be considered a form of “incarceration.” The court stated, “While defendant was not within the four walls of a prison, his liberty was significantly curtailed. He was not free to go where he pleased. In that sense, he was ‘confined,’ and in that sense ‘incarcerated.’” The dissent argued that the term “incarcerated” should be interpreted in its plain meaning, referring only to confinement within prison walls, and that the majority was improperly expanding the definition metaphorically. The dissent contended that someone in a day reporting program had significantly more freedom than someone incarcerated, similar to someone on probation or parole, who is undisputedly not considered incarcerated. The majority rejected this argument, focusing on the degree of restriction imposed by the day reporting program as the determining factor. This case establishes a broader interpretation of “incarceration” for sentencing purposes, focusing on the degree of restriction imposed on an individual’s liberty, even if they are not physically confined within a prison.