People v. Feingold, 7 N.Y.3d 752 (2006)

A conviction for depraved indifference murder requires more than recklessness; it requires conduct evincing a depraved indifference to human life, and a request for a lesser-included charge of manslaughter does not forfeit a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence for depraved indifference.

Summary

The New York Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order, reducing the defendant’s conviction of depraved indifference murder to manslaughter in the second degree. The Court held that the defendant’s actions, while possibly reckless, did not meet the threshold for depraved indifference murder as defined by the statute and clarified in prior cases. The Court also rejected the argument that the defendant forfeited his right to challenge the depraved indifference murder conviction by requesting a charge on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter. The case was remitted for resentencing.

Facts

The defendant was convicted of depraved indifference murder. The specific facts surrounding the crime are not detailed in this memorandum opinion, but the court implies the defendant’s actions, though resulting in death, did not rise to the level of depraved indifference.

Procedural History

The defendant was initially convicted of depraved indifference murder in Supreme Court. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and modified the order, reducing the conviction to manslaughter in the second degree and remitting the case to the Supreme Court for resentencing.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the defendant’s conduct constituted depraved indifference murder under Penal Law § 125.25(2)?

2. Whether the defendant forfeited his right to challenge the sufficiency of his conviction for depraved indifference murder by requesting that the jury be charged on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter in the second degree?

Holding

1. No, because the defendant’s actions, while perhaps reckless, did not demonstrate the depraved indifference to human life required for a conviction under Penal Law § 125.25(2).

2. No, because “Depraved indifference” is an additional core statutory requirement of depraved indifference murder, beyond mere recklessness and risk.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals relied on its prior holdings in People v. Payne and People v. Suarez to clarify the definition of depraved indifference murder. The court emphasized that depraved indifference requires more than just recklessness or risk of harm; it requires a particularly blameworthy state of mind demonstrating a complete disregard for human life. The court found that the evidence presented did not establish this level of depravity. Regarding the forfeiture argument, the Court stated, “‘Depraved indifference’ is an additional core statutory requirement of depraved indifference murder, beyond mere recklessness and risk.” The court reasoned that requesting a charge on a lesser-included offense does not preclude a defendant from challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on the “depraved indifference” element of the murder charge. The court noted, “testimony at trial could have led a rational jury to infer that the victim moved into a shot that was intended only to scare him,” indicating that the evidence pointed more towards recklessness than depraved indifference. Judge Graffeo concurred in the result, constrained by the precedent set in People v Suarez.