People v. Wood, 8 N.Y.3d 224 (2007)
When a criminal statute contains an exclusionary clause that requires reference to another statute for a complete definition, the clause operates as a proviso that the accused may raise in defense, rather than an exception that the prosecution must plead in the accusatory instrument.
Summary
Defendant was convicted of criminal contempt for violating an order of protection. He argued that the accusatory instrument was jurisdictionally defective because it failed to state that the crime did not arise out of a labor dispute, as referenced in Penal Law § 215.50(3). The Court of Appeals held that the “labor disputes” clause operates as a proviso, not an exception, because it requires reference to Judiciary Law § 753-a for its complete definition. Therefore, the prosecution was not required to plead it in the accusatory instrument.
Facts
The defendant punched his roommate in the head and was charged with assault. A temporary order of protection was issued, which the defendant violated by harassing his roommate. A second order of protection was issued, prohibiting the defendant from residing in the apartment. He violated this order by continuing to live there.
Procedural History
The defendant was charged with criminal contempt in the second degree for violating the second order of protection. A jury found him guilty of both criminal contempt and assault in the third degree. The Appellate Term affirmed the conviction, and the case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether the reference to “labor disputes” in Penal Law § 215.50(3) creates an exception that must be affirmatively pleaded by the prosecution in the accusatory instrument, or a proviso that need not be pleaded but may be raised by the accused as a defense.
Holding
No, because the exclusionary language in the second-degree criminal contempt provision (Penal Law § 215.50(3)) does not provide a complete definition of the class of cases that the Legislature intended to remove from the ambit of criminal contempt, and the statute requires reference to a definition of “labor disputes” set forth outside the Penal Law.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals distinguished between exceptions and provisos in criminal statutes. It stated, “essential allegations are generally determined by the statute defining the crime. If the defining statute contains an exception, the [accusatory instrument] must allege that the crime is not within the exception. But when the exception is found outside the statute, the exception generally is a matter for the defendant to raise in defense, either under the general issue or by affirmative defense” (quoting People v. Kohut, 30 NY2d 183, 187 (1972)). Legislative intent to create an exception is generally found when the language of exclusion is contained entirely within the Penal Law provision itself. The court reasoned that because Penal Law § 215.50(3) requires reference to Judiciary Law § 753-a to define “labor disputes,” it operates as a proviso. It further stated that it would defy “common sense and reasonable pleading” (quoting People v. Devinny, 227 NY 397, 401 (1919)) to require the People to negate each of the alternatives specified in Judiciary Law § 753-a in every criminal contempt accusatory instrument. Therefore, the “labor disputes” clause is a proviso that the accused may raise in defense. If the accused raises the issue, the People must then establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the labor disputes proviso does not apply.