People v. Conway, 6 N.Y.3d 869 (2006)
Criminal negligence requires a defendant to fail to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk, and this failure must be a gross deviation from the standard of care a reasonable person would observe in the situation.
Summary
This case examines the level of negligence required for a criminal conviction, specifically for assault in the third degree involving a deadly weapon. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that sufficient evidence existed for a rational trier of fact to find that a police officer acted with criminal negligence when his gun accidentally discharged while attempting to apprehend a fleeing suspect. The Court emphasized that criminal negligence demands a gross deviation from reasonable care, more than ordinary civil negligence.
Facts
A 16-year-old, Dantae Johnson, was walking with a friend when an unmarked police car approached. An officer voiced a suspicion that Johnson was carrying a gun. Johnson ignored the officers and fled when two officers exited the car. Defendant Officer Conway pursued Johnson in the car, drove onto the sidewalk, unholstered his gun, and reached out the window to grab Johnson. While struggling to control both the car and Johnson, the gun discharged, severely wounding Johnson. No gun was found on Johnson.
Procedural History
The trial court convicted Officer Conway of criminally negligent assault in the third degree. The Appellate Division reversed the judgment on the law for legal insufficiency and dismissed the indictment. One Justice dissented and granted the People permission to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether sufficient evidence existed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Officer Conway acted with criminal negligence when his gun discharged, resulting in injury to Dantae Johnson.
Holding
Yes, because a rational trier of fact could conclude that Officer Conway’s conduct constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care expected of a reasonable police officer in that situation.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals emphasized that criminal negligence requires a greater degree of carelessness than ordinary civil negligence. “The carelessness required for criminal negligence is appreciably more serious than that for ordinary civil negligence, and that the carelessness must be such that its seriousness would be apparent to anyone who shares the community’s general sense of right and wrong.” The court found that Officer Conway’s actions—simultaneously manipulating a gun with his finger on the trigger and the steering wheel while reaching out of the car to grab the suspect—created a substantial and unjustifiable risk. This conduct was deemed a “blameworthy conduct creat[ing] or contribut[ing] to a substantial and unjustifiable risk.” The court reasoned that a jury could rationally conclude that this was a gross deviation from the standard of care expected of a reasonable police officer. The dissent argued that the Appellate Division’s decision rested on a factual determination beyond the Court of Appeals’ review and that the evidence was insufficient to prove criminal negligence, as Conway’s conduct did not demonstrate an insensitivity to the interests and claims of others in society. The dissent cited People v. Boutin, 75 N.Y.2d 692 (1990), emphasizing that even strong evidence of ordinary negligence is insufficient for criminal negligence. “[E]ven strong evidence of negligence in the ordinary sense is not sufficient to support a verdict of criminal negligence. The evidence must rationally support a finding of what we called in Boutin ‘criminally culpable risk-creating conduct’.”