6 N.Y.3d 604 (2006)
The Rules of Judicial Conduct can be used to prove the element of a judge’s “duty as a public servant” within the meaning of Penal Law § 200.25, when the judge accepts a benefit for violating an official duty.
Summary
The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether evidence presented to a grand jury, indicating a judge accepted a benefit for violating his duty as a public servant under the Rules of Judicial Conduct, was sufficient to support charges of receiving reward for official misconduct. The Court held that the People could rely on the Rules to establish a violation of official duties, as the Rules set forth a constitutionally mandated duty. The Court reinstated six counts of receiving reward for official misconduct, finding the evidence legally sufficient. A count charging defendant with official misconduct was properly dismissed.
Facts
Gerald Garson, a New York Supreme Court Justice, allegedly engaged in a course of conduct from October 2001 to March 2003 where he violated his duties as a public servant in exchange for cash and gratuities. Evidence showed a relationship with attorney Paul Siminovsky, who regularly appeared before Garson, where Siminovsky provided meals and gifts expecting and receiving preferential treatment. Garson allegedly conducted improper ex parte conversations with Siminovsky about the “Levi case,” receiving a box of cigars as a reward. Garson also allegedly accepted monies for referring clients to Siminovsky, with Siminovsky compensating Garson for these referrals.
Procedural History
The grand jury indicted Garson on multiple counts, including six counts of receiving reward for official misconduct. The Supreme Court dismissed these six counts, holding that the Rules of Judicial Conduct could not establish a violation of duty as a public servant. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether evidence presented to a grand jury that a judge accepted a benefit for violation of his duty as a public servant, as defined by the Rules of Judicial Conduct, is legally sufficient to support six counts of receiving reward for official misconduct in the second degree (Penal Law § 200.25).
Holding
Yes, because the Rules of Judicial Conduct set forth a constitutionally mandated duty upon the judiciary, and when combined with the additional factor of receiving a reward, a violation of that duty may serve as a basis for prosecution under Penal Law § 200.25.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court reasoned that Penal Law § 200.25, which addresses bribery involving public servants, is intended to be comprehensive to prevent abuses of power. The statute specifically defines “public servant” and “benefit” broadly. The legislature did not define “duty” to allow for factual resolution based on the misconduct alleged. The Court rejected the argument that judges should be immune from criminal prosecution when they receive a benefit after violating a judicial rule. The Court stated that to hold otherwise would lead to the incongruous result of insulating judges from criminal liability because they have a formal body of rules governing their conduct while subjecting other public servants to criminal liability for similar conduct. The Court distinguished People v. La Carrubba, noting that the Rules of Judicial Conduct, unlike the Code of Judicial Conduct in La Carrubba, are rooted in the State Constitution and are mandatory. A key distinction is that the criminal prosecution rests not on a violation of the Rules alone but on the acceptance of a benefit for violating an official duty defined by the Rules. As the Court stated, “The law binds all men equally, the Judges no less than the judged” (Matter of Stern v Morgenthau, 62 NY2d 331, 339 [1984]). Judge G.B. Smith dissented in part, arguing that the Rules of Judicial Conduct were not intended as criminal statutes and that there was no legislative intent to make criminal judicial conduct based upon the Rules.